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of combat operations, the analysis of PSO aims at avoiding conflict situations, 
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The purpose of this thesis is to develop an election scenario to evaluate 
and gain insight on the proposed military tactics, techniques and procedures 
which may affect the outcome of peacekeeping operations in a homogeneous 
(Sunni) and a heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) populated Iraqi town. The 
proposed multiple security control regions with manned checkpoints aim to 
provide a secure and safe environment for both the soldiers and Iraqi voters. The 
proposed election booths are deployed to encourage voter participation and 
deter escalation of civilian’s aggression.  The possibilities of enlisting the 
cooperation and leveraging the influence of leaders of two potential hostile 
civilian groups are studied to identify their impacts on the election outcomes. In 
addition, different levels and variability in civilian fear, anger, and other emotional 
states are explored to determine their roles in the escalation or de-escalation 
processes. The voter participation rates, escalation among civilians, and civilian-
military interactions are the primary measures of effectiveness. 
Based on the October 15, 2005 referendum results, abstractions of the 
representative Iraqi towns, such as Anbar and Tamin, are built and modeled in 
the simulation. The basic model reflects the town and polling center layout, 
multiple civilian groups and its civilian personalities. Peacekeeping operations 
revolve around non-use of force, except in self-defense. Hence, a non-attrition 
agent-based simulation software called PAX, which features social psychological 
and Rules of Engagement (ROE) models for peace support operations, is used 
to conduct the simulation. An efficient experimental design, with excellent space 
filling and orthogonality properties, allows data to be collected for a broad variety 
of scenarios while keeping the required number of simulation runs to a 
manageable size.  Graphical and statistical techniques are used to characterize 
the simulation outputs, allowing key factors that have significant impact on the 
success of peacekeeping operations to be identified.  
 xxiv
One scenario is based on an Iraqi town with a homogeneous (Sunni) 
population, modeled after towns in the Anbar province where voter participation 
was low and violence was high during the October 2005 election.  The results for 
this scenario show that the deployment of election booths contributes to 
significant improvement to the average voting participation.  While there is also 
an increase in civilian escalation, this is considered non-alarming and 
controllable. Observations made from the simulation runs indicate that the 
election booths manage to attract the hostile civilians. While soldiers at the 
election booths attempt to calm and pacify the hostile civilians, opportunities are 
created for elective motivated civilians to proceed to the poll center and cast their 
votes. Increasing the elective motivation of some Sunni registered voters has a 
significant positive impact on the average voter participation, and also reduces 
civilian escalation in the election. The election operations are more successful if 
the readiness for aggression of the Sunni bystanders and fearful voters can be 
reduced. The analysis results also indicate that attempts to enlist the cooperation 
of civilian leaders to deescalate the situation should focus on leaders of hostile 
registered voters. 
The second scenario is based on an Iraqi town with a heterogeneous 
(Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) population, modeled after towns in the Tamin province where 
voter participation was higher and less violence occurred during the October 
2005 election.  In this scenario, the deployment of Election Booths has little 
impact on the average voter participation. However, maximizing the elective 
motivation of Shiite/Kurd Voter leads to a substantive improvement in both the 
average voter participation and civilian escalation in the election. Minimizing the 
readiness for aggression of the Sunni voters and Shiite/Kurd voters is also 
beneficial. In this scenario, there is no sufficient statistical evidence to suggest 
that the military should focus on the leadership of a hostile registered voters or 
hostile unregistered voters. 
The analysis also concludes that small variability among civilian 
personalities is associated with higher voter participation and lower civilian 
 xxv
escalation in both scenarios. Two ROE sets are identified for soldiers within the 
control area, and one ROE set is identified for soldiers within the poll area.  By 
executing these ROEs, soldiers contribute to higher voter participation and lower 
civilian escalation in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios. 
These common ROEs suggest that the effort required in training the ill-equipped 
Iraqi forces can now be streamlined, hence reducing the length of their learning 
curve. 
In general, the modeling and analysis approaches established in this 
thesis seek to develop a basis for future studies on other Iraq cities or other 
nations that face similar election situations. The results and insights gained may 
act as possible guidelines for decision makers in preparing the Iraqi forces for the 
upcoming elections, specifically in the area of reducing civilian escalation and 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
On May 1, 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush declared the end of 
major combat operations terminating the Ba'ath Party's rule [Teimourian, 2003] 
and removing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from office. On October 16, 2003, 
the U.N. Security Council authorized a multinational force [Multi-National Force, 
2005a] in Iraq to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of 
security and stability in Iraq. Until the time when local police can be organized for 
securing public order, occupying armed forces may have to be deployed in this 
role [Human Rights Watch, 2005]. “Since then, this multinational force has 
engaged in a mix of lower-combat, lower-risk peacekeeping and higher-combat, 
higher-risk peace enforcement. This distinction is important because such a mix 
will see more troops killed in Iraq than would occur from keeping the peace 
alone.” [Burgess, 2003]. The 2,000 mark in U.S. military deaths is approaching at 
a time when Iraqi and U.S. officials are congratulating themselves that the 
October 15, 2005 constitutional referendum and the start of Saddam Hussein's 
trial four days later passed without major bloodshed and destruction [Hamza, 
2005a]. President Bush outlined his five-point plan to return Iraq to self-rule and 
to rebuild its institutions in a speech to U.S. military Central Command personnel 
at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida on June 16 2004. Listing the points, 
the president said: “We're handing over authority to a sovereign Iraqi 
government. We're encouraging more international support for Iraq's political 
transition. We're helping Iraqis take responsibility for their own security. We're 
continuing to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure, and we're helping Iraq move to free 
elections.” [CPA, 2005a].  
Soon after, the transfer of sovereignty from the coalition to an interim Iraqi 
government occurred on June 28, 2004. Controversially, the coalition forces are 
currently an official occupying power. Under the United Nations command, 
Coalition troops can remain in control of the country indefinitely despite the 
transfer of sovereignty. Since Iraqi forces are currently considered ill-equipped to 
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police and secure the country, it is expected that coalition troops will remain in 
the country for many years to come [Pollack, 2004]. The “reconstruction and 
democratization of Iraq” has been a major stated goal of the Bush administration 
since declaring the “end of major combat operations” in the 2003 Iraq war 
[Pollack, 2004]. The first major step will be Iraqi self-governance. Hence, a 
successful election is desired and viewed as a positive transition milestone from 
military to full civil control. Most importantly, it is a prerequisite for establishing a 
long-standing and self-sustaining peace in Iraq. On January 30, 2005, the Iraqi 
people chose representatives for the newly formed 275-member Iraqi National 
Assembly in legislative elections. Following the ratification of the constitution of 
Iraq on October 15, 2005, a general election was called for December 15, 2005, 
to elect a permanent 275-member Iraqi National Assembly. Still, terrorists attack 
civilian targets and insurgents battle against coalition forces and newly formed 
Iraqi institutions in some pockets of the country, and so hamper the emergence 
of post-war stability. Although some progress is being made, crime and 
infrastructure problems continue to plague the country, also contributing to anti-
occupation sentiments. A 2005 poll by British intelligence reported that 45% of 
Iraqis support attacks against coalition forces, rising to 65% in some areas, and 
that 82% are “strongly opposed” to the presence of foreign troops. Demands for 
U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's Parliament 
[Rayment, 2005].  
Facing this heightened aggression and civilian fear, can the coalition 
forces effectively train the ill-equipped Iraqi forces to uphold their own country’s 
law and order while not raising the fear of this war-torn society from going 
towards a civil war? Can the coalition forces expedite the “reconstruction and 
democratization of Iraq” process to cushion the anti-occupation sentiments and 
eliminate those intimidating insurgency threats?  
 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an election scenario to evaluate 
and gain insight on the proposed military tactics, techniques and procedures 
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which may affect the outcome of peacekeeping operations in a homogeneous 
(Sunni) and a heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) populated representative Iraqi 
town. 
The analysis of this thesis seeks to explore factors such as soldier’s rules 
of engagement (ROE), civilian personalities and attention of civilian leadership. 
These factors can potentially cause civilian behavior to escalate or weaken 
during an election day proceeding. We will also seek to identify other significant 
factors that most accurately achieve the lowest level of civilian readiness for 
aggression. The goal of this thesis is to gain knowledge and to contribute 
guidelines, specifically in the area of reducing civilian escalation and improving 
voter participation, in order for decision makers to conduct successful elections. 
United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in his message 
to the Iraqi people on National Constitution Day (13 October 2005), “At this 
critical moment in Iraq’s history, every vote counts.  Whatever the outcome, the 
United Nations will continue to do all it can to help you succeed on whichever 
path you choose for building a stable, unified and prosperous Iraq.” [UN, 2005]. 
 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis focuses primarily on the effects of military tactics, techniques 
and procedures executed during an election day in a representative Iraqi town, 
particularly in a homogeneous (Sunni) and a heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) 
populated town. In each of the population scenarios, a study is conducted. Areas 
that are examined include the presence of multiple civilian groups, the effect of 
providing the civilians with physical and psychological securities (particularly the 
execution of security control regions), media booths used to promote “elective 
motivation”, and the importance of and attention to civilian group leadership. 
Based on the October 15, 2005 constitution referendum results, an 
abstraction of the representative Iraqi town was built and modeled in an agent-
based simulation platform.  This model reflects the town’s structural and polling 
center layout, multiple civilian groups and its civilian personalities. “Peacekeeping 
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revolves around non-use of force, except in self-defense” [Burgess, 2003]. 
Hence, PAX is used to conduct the simulation. PAX is a non-attrition agent-
based simulation platform, developed for the German armed forces that features 
social psychological and ROE model for peace support operations [Schwarz, 
2005].  
To explore the performance of the simulation both broadly and efficiently, 
Design of Experiment (DOE) using Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
designs are used.  These designs have excellent space filling and near 
orthogonality properties, and reduce the required number of simulation runs to a 
manageable number. The simulation output data are analyzed using a JMP 5.1 
statistical package [SAS, 2005] where regression trees and linear regression 
models are built. 
 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis aims to derive conclusions and insights that can provide 
guidance for decision-makers in conducting successful elections. The following 
questions are what this thesis seeks to answer. Given a homogeneous (Sunni) or 
heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) population scenario and in the presence of 
multiple civilian group interactions: 
• What and how can physical security help to provide a secure and 
safe environment for both the soldiers and different groups of 
civilian voters?  
• How can the psychological security that encourages voter 
participation and deters escalation of civilian aggression be 
increased?  
• What is the expected voter participation and civilian escalation? 
• What military ROE should be employed at different military control 
regions in order to reduce aggressive actions among civilians and 
peacekeeping personnel?  
• What are the factors that have the greatest influence on voter 
participation and civilian escalation?  
• What type of ROE set can best achieve highest voter participation 
and lowest civilian escalation?  
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• For which civilian group that possesses high potential of escalating 
conflicts during the election should the military seek to enlist the 
cooperation of the leadership?  
• Is the deployment of “Elective Motivation” promoting booths 
important?  
• How can the variability of civilian personalities affect the election 
results?  
• Are there any common ROE set(s) or significant factor(s) that best 
suit or represent both homogeneous and heterogeneous population 
scenarios?  
 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This document is organized into six chapters.  Chapter I provides the 
introduction to and background for the post-war situation in Iraq, as well as the 
purpose of this research work. Chapter II looks at the problem in detail and 
attempts to highlight some of the key distinctions between homogeneous and 
heterogeneous populations. A hybrid model is derived for this research. Chapter 
III introduces PAX and describes how the hybrid model is built using this agent-
based software package. Chapter IV describes the efficient experimental design 
used to explore the scenario and presents the results and analysis of the 
experiment. Chapter V summarizes of the results and provides detailed 
comparisons between the homogeneous and heterogeneous population 
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II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTION 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Peacekeeping operations can be multi-dimensional, especially in the 
efforts to coordinate political, military, and development operations at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels [Jablonsky and McCallum, 1999].  
This thesis focuses primarily on the small military forces deployed at the 
tactical operation level during an election day. They are armed only for self-
defense, deployed in a representative Iraqi town conducting peace-building 
efforts with the civilian voters. Among the civilian voters, there is also a fraction of 
hostilities.  
The post-war situation in Iraq is addressed first since it highlights potential 
problems that can further deteriorate the already war-torn country. Some of the 
problems will be focused on by the proposed military tactics, techniques and 
procedures discussed in Chapter III.  
A set of non-traditional measures of effectiveness is listed.  These will be 
used to evaluate the success of the proposed military measures in this non-
combat peacekeeping mission. 
 
B. UNDERSTANDING IRAQ 
1. Iraq Demographics  
Iraq is divided into 18 governorates or provinces with a pictorial 
representation as shown in 0 [BBC, 2005a]. Iraq has a population of about 27 
million people with two large ethnic groups, namely Arabs (75-80%) and Kurds 
(15-25%). The Arabs are subdivided into Shiite Arabs and Sunni Arabs. Other 
distinct groups are Turkomans, Assyrians, Iranians, Lurs, and Armenians (5%).  
The predominant religion in Iraq is Muslim, comprising 95-97% of the 
population, while Christians, Yezidi and others represent the remaining 3-5%. 
Most (60%) Iraqi Muslims are members of the Shiites, but there is a large Sunni 
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Muslim population as well, made up of both Arabs and Kurds. Small communities 
of Christians, Jews, Bahá'ís, Mandaeans, and Yezidis also exist [CIA, 2005]. 
 
 
Figure 1 18 Iraq Governorates and Main Ethnic Group Locations (From: CIA, 
2005) 
 
Ethnic differences can impact lives in ways that both alienate and bring 
people together. As with many countries in Africa and the Middle East, Iraq’s 
borders were not decided by the people of the region, but by outside forces. Over 
time, this reality has presented a challenge for a united Iraq, as each ethnic 
group claims a cultural connection to the tract of land that they consider to be 
their homeland. The differences among these groups vary from slight to severe, 
and competing interests threaten to complicate the formation of Iraq’s post-
Saddam government. Both the Shiites and the Kurds were excluded from power 
during the regime of Saddam Hussein, dominated by members of the Sunni Arab 
9 
minority. Both the Shiite and Sunni sects are comprised of ethnic Arabs, but their 
religious differences have shaped them into separate cultures. Kurds share 
ethnic ties with Iranians and the desire to form their own independent state. This 
is evident in their several failed attempts to negotiate a territorial agreement with 
Iraq [Crabb, 2003]. 
The three major ethnic groups, namely Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs and 
Kurds, are regarded to be the main influences contributing to the evolution of 
modern Iraq. They will be addressed in this thesis.  
2. Homogeneous Population Hierarchy 
From 0, it is evident that the provinces in Iraq can be represented by two 
main types of populations, namely homogeneous and heterogeneous. The latter 
will be discussed in next section. 
In a homogeneous population group, it is distinctively illustrated that the 
three major ethnic groups (Sunni, Shiite and Kurd) each have their majority 
residing in different regions of the country, namely in the western, southern and 
northern parts of Iraq. In the western region, the Sunni majority reside in 
provinces like Anbar and Salahudin with capitals at Ramadi and Tikrit. In the 
southern region, the Shiite majority reside in provinces like Dhi Qar and 
Muthanna with capitals at Nasiriyah and Samawa. In the northern region, the 
Kurd majority reside in provinces like Arbil and Douhuk with capitals at Arbil and 
Douhuk.   
In October 2005, the constitution referendum results reflected 
overwhelming support from both the Shiite and Kurd populations. Shiite Arabs, 
who account for about 60% of Iraq's population, overwhelmingly favored passage 
of the constitution. Kurds, who make up about 20% of the population, also 
strongly embraced the charter, which grants far-reaching autonomy to their 
region in northern Iraq. Sunni Arabs who came close to defeating the charter will 
now try to amend it after electing a new legislature in December [Anderson, 
Cannistra and Tobey, 2005]. These results indicated that provinces with Shiites 
and Kurds as the majority had no difficulty dealing with voter participation and 
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civilian escalation. However, some fear Shiite and Kurd victories, which came 
despite a large turnout by Sunni Arabs in an effort to defeat the constitutional 
referendum, could enrage many members of the minority and fuel their support 
for the insurgency.  
Therefore, in a homogeneous population scenario, this thesis shall focus 
its research on Sunni majority population scenarios where most of the violence 
has taken place and extreme sides of the voter participation have occurred. A 
typical voter hierarchy of a homogeneous (Sunni) population is illustrated in 

































Figure 2 Voter Hierarchy in Homogeneous Population (Sunni)  
 
In a typical election scenario, there are unregistered and registered voter 
groups. The unregistered voter group consists of a small portion of civilians and a 
fraction of hostile individuals. In this thesis, the hostile individuals are referred to 
as the “disturbers” whom are the insurgents. These groups of insurgents may or 
may not have any leadership.  
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In the registered voter group, there are motivated and unmotivated voters. 
This is where the majority of the population belongs. Among the motivated voter 
group, there are a mixture of “Yes” and “No” voters. The “Yes” voters supported 
Iraq’s new political system and the “No” voters believed the Shiite-dominated 
government will further deprive them of their fair share in the country's vast oil 
wealth [Keath, 2005a].  
Among the unmotivated registered voter group, there are several types of 
voters. “Bystander and fearful” voters are those who stay away from the election. 
Some may perceive that their votes will not have any significant impact on the 
election result, while others may fear becoming victims of the more intimidating 
insurgency threats. Within this unmotivated voter group, there is also a small 
group who may support the Sunni-led insurgency. In this thesis, this minority 
group is referred to as the “trouble-maker” group. They belong to the registered 
voter group and are allowed to enter the polling center, but once inside they may 
turn hostile and instigate conflicts among the civilians and soldiers. These groups 
of trouble-makers may or may not have any leadership. 
3. Heterogeneous Population Hierarchy 
In a heterogeneous population scenario, we will see a mixture of Sunni, 
Shiite and Kurd populations. As shown in Figure 1, provinces like Kirkuk, 
Baqouba, Nineveh, Tamin, and Diyala are places where heterogeneous 
populations reside. Some of these mixed areas are primarily Sunni, some are 
primarily Kurd, some are primarily Shiite population, and some have 
approximately equal proportions of Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis. 
In October 2005, the constitution referendum results indicated that Sunni 
Arabs voted in surprisingly high numbers on Iraq’s new constitution, many of 
them hoping to defeat it in an intense competition with Shiites and Kurds over the 
shape of the nation's young democracy after decades of dictatorship [Keath, 
2005b]. These results also indicated that the voting turnout rate was high in the 
mixed areas. With this increase in voter participation, it suggests an expected 
increase in the civilian interactions that may contribute significant increase in the 
conflicts between the civilian groups who turn up at the polling center.  
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Therefore, in a heterogeneous population scenario, this thesis shall focus 
its research on scenarios with equally large Sunni and Shiite/Kurd populations 
where we have large numbers of Sunni and Shiite/Kurd motivated voters coming 
forward to cast their votes. A typical voter hierarchy of a heterogeneous Sunni 



































Figure 3 Voter Hierarchy in Heterogeneous Population (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd)  
 
The hierarchy in a typical heterogeneous election population scenario is 
similar to the homogeneous population hierarchy except for two differences. 
First, in a mixed population scenario, there is an addition of the Shiite/Kurd 
registered voter group. As the October 2005 referendum results indicated, there 
was a large turnout from both Shiite and Kurd groups. This thesis will model 
Shiites and Kurds as one “Yes” voter group for the heterogeneous scenario. 
Secondly, the Sunni bystander and fearful voter group constitute the minority of 
the registered Sunni voter group since the results indicated large turnout by the 
Sunni. 
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4. Politics in Iraq 
Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally 
provided about 95% of foreign exchange earnings. Many Sunnis have said they 
were concerned that the charter would divide the nation on sectarian lines by 
permitting the formation of autonomous regions. They also said it would deprive 
them of oil revenue by ceding control of the oil-rich north to the Kurds and the 
southern oil fields to the majority Shiite Muslims, leaving Sunnis relegated to the 
resource-poor center [Alexander, 2005]. 
Many believe that the divisions of ethnic and sectarian lines in the Iraqi 
society have fueled a violent Sunni-led insurgency against the government and 
U.S. occupation forces [Anderson, Cannistra and Tobey, 2005]. These sectarian 
line frictions among the ethnic groups suggest that it should be solved at a 
national level and thus it will not be studied in this thesis. 
5. Insurgents and Non-Violent Groups in Iraq 
With the grim milestone of the 2,000th U.S. military death looming in Iraq, 
many wonder about the direction of the insurgency that killed most of them. 
Experts think the country's increasingly regional-oriented politics will fuel the 
insurgency and even spread it further inside Iraq. Others put forward a simple, 
disquieting scenario: So long as U.S. and other foreign troops remain in Iraq, the 
insurgency will continue. Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, 
said troops captured more than 300 foreign fighters and killed 100 members of 
al-Qaeda in Iraq during the past six months. Other successes include the 
detention of 600 insurgents two weeks before the referendum, said Maj. Gen. 
William G. Webster, commander of U.S. forces in Baghdad. However, “The 
insurgents are still there,” Lynch cautioned. “They still want to derail the 
democratic process. They still want to discredit the Iraqi government, so 
operations continue.” [Hamza, 2005a]. 
Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in the al-
Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western 
outskirts of Baghdad. This is attributed to a number of reasons, including the lack 
of the employment opportunities of the old regime, tribal customs, suspicion of 
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outsiders, and the religious conservatism of the area. Coalition “counter-
insurgency” operations have suffered heavy casualties in the province. In this 
thesis, we refer to this group of insurgents as the disturbers. 
Apart from the armed insurgency, there are important non-violent groups 
that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The National Foundation 
Congress that was set up by Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi includes a broad range of 
religious, ethnic, and political currents united by their opposition to the 
occupation. Although it does not reject armed insurgency, which it regards as any 
nation's right, it favors non-violent politics and criticizes the formation of militias. 
The General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) opposes the occupation and calls 
for immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops but was neutral on participation in 
the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all foreign troops out immediately, both 
the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and the Workers Councils call for 
replacement of US and British forces with neutral forces from the U.N., the Arab 
League and other nations as a transition [Bruskin, Guillen, Mason, 
Muehlenkamp, Wohlforth, 2005].  
In this thesis, civilians belonging to these non-violent groups that might 
create public disturbances during the election process are called trouble-makers. 
These heightened insurgency threats and dynamics among the multiple 
civilian groups suggest that the presence of the insurgents and non-violent 
groups plays an important role in the election process and outcomes. Counter-
insurgencies measures should continue to be identified and implemented. 
Leaders of the different groups may be able to exert considerable influences over 
their followers. Military measures should further exploit this leadership influence 
to reach another level of cooperation during elections.  
Therefore, this thesis shall focus on the existence of these disturber and 





6. Iraq Election Results 
This section summarizes the recent Iraq election results and discusses the 
different election participation and responses that were demonstrated by the 
Shiite, Kurd and Sunni groups; especially their responses over the reversal 
decision on the election rule. 
The multinational force invasion of Iraq in 2003 overthrew Saddam's 
administration and installed an interim government, which represented all Iraq's 
ethnic and religious communities. On January 30, 2005, the Iraqi people chose 
representatives for the newly-formed 275-member Iraqi National Assembly in 
legislative elections. Following the ratification of the constitution of Iraq on 
October 15, 2005, a general election was called for December 15, 2005 to elect a 
permanent 275-member Iraqi National Assembly. The following sections 
summarize the three elections. 
a. Legislative Election – January 2005  
On January 30, 2005, a historic election gave Iraq its first 
democratically elected government in decades. Though it marked a major morale 
success over the insurgency, the victory was rapidly overshadowed by relentless 
and aggressive post-election insurgency threats. 
The provisional results released on February 13 are presented in 
Table 1. They show that the United Iraqi Alliance, tacitly backed by Shiite leader 
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, led with 48% of the vote. The Democratic Patriotic 
Alliance of Kurdistan was in second place with 26% of the vote. Prime Minister 
Ayad Allawi's party, the Iraqi List, came in third with 14%. The most prominent 
party excluded was the secular, but predominantly Sunni, Independent 
Democrats Movement led by former exile Adnan Pachachi [IEC, 2005 and BBC, 
2005b, and Wikipedia, 2005]. 
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Summary of the January 2005 
Legislative Election Results Votes % Seats Leaders 
United Iraqi Alliance 4,075,292 48.19% 140 
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim,  
Ibrahim al-Jaafari,  
Hussain al-Shahristani,  
Ahmed Chalabi 
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of 
Kurdistan 2,175,551 25.73% 75 
Jalal Talabani,  
Masoud Barzani 
Iraqi List 1,168,943 13.82% 40 Iyad Allawi 
The Iraqis 150,680 1.78% 5 Ghazi al Yawer 
Iraqi Turkmen Front 93,480 1.11% 3 Farok Abdullah  Abdurrahman 
National Independent Cadres and 
Elites 69,938 0.83% 3 Fatah al Sheikh 
People's Union 69,920 0.83% 2 Hamid Majid Mousa 
Islamic Group of Kurdistan 60,592 0.72% 2 Ali Abd al Aziz 
Islamic Action Organization In Iraq -
Central Command 43,205 0.51% 2  
National Democratic Alliance 36,795 0.44% 1  
National Rafidain List 36,255 0.43% 1 Yonadem Kana 
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc 30,796 0.36% 1 Mishaan Jibouri 
Iraq Assembly of National Unity 23,686 0.28% 0 Dr. Nehro Mohammed 
Assembly of Independent 
Democrats 23,302 0.28% 0 Adnan Pachachi 
Iraqi Islamic Party 21,342 0.25% 0 Mohsen Abdel Hamid 
Islamic Dawa Movement 19,373 0.23% 0 Adil Abd Al Raheem 
Iraqi National Gathering 18,862 0.22% 0 Hussein al-Jibouri 
Iraqi Republican Assembly 15,452 0.18% 0 Sa'ad Al-Janabi 
Constitutional Monarchy - Al-Sharif 
Ali bin Al-Hussein 13,740 0.16% 0 Sharif Ali bin Al-Hussein
Others 309,062 3.65% 0  
Total 8,456,266 100 275  
Invalid-votes 94,305    
 
Table 1 Legislative Election Results – January 2005 
 
The results clearly indicated a decisive victory for the Shiite and 
Kurd population. Areas with mixed populations saw the vast majority of voters 
supported Shiite or Kurdish parties. One challenge to the legitimacy of the 
election was the low Arab Sunni turnout, which was as low as 2% in the province 
of Anbar. In another example, the largest Arab Sunni party, The Iraqis, obtained 
only 1.78% of the vote. Major Arab Sunni parties, such as the Iraqi Islamic Party, 
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the Association of Muslim Scholars, and some smaller groups such as the 
Worker-Communist Party of Iraq, boycotted the elections. The boycott was 
largely a product of the threatened violence, which centered in the Arab Sunni 
areas. The Arab Sunni party leaders felt that it would be impossible to hold fair 
elections in their areas. The major Arab Sunni groups called for elections to be 
postponed until the safety of voters could be guaranteed. This call for a delay 
was supported by some in the west, but any such scheme was strongly opposed 
by the Shiite parties. Resolving the issue of Sunni underrepresentation in the 
National Assembly, major party leaders had assured the Arab Sunnis that they 
would have input into drafting of the new constitution and at least one of the 
major government positions will go to an Arab Sunni [IEC, 2005 and BBC, 2005b 
and Wikipedia, 2005]. 
b. Constitution Referendum – October 2005  
Shortly before the referendum was to take place, Iraq’s Shiite-led 
parliament changed the electoral law so that two-thirds of the registered voters 
would have to reject the referendum for it to fail. This had led to many Sunni Arab 
leaders threatening to boycott the election. Under U.S. and U.N. pressure, Iraq's 
Shiite-led parliament reversed its last-minute electoral law changes. The final rule 
said that, for the referendum to fail, two-thirds of those casting ballots had to vote 
“no” instead of two-thirds of the registered voters. This reversal had gained wide 
support and satisfaction from many Sunni Arab leaders and they had mobilized 
followers to defeat the charter at the polls.  
On October 15, 2005, more than 63% of eligible Iraqis came out 
across the country to vote on whether to accept or reject the new constitution. 
U.N. Commission officials released the final results on October 25, which 
indicated that the constitution had been approved. Overall, 79% of voters backed 
the charter and 21% opposed it. Of 18 governorates, two recorded “No” votes 
greater than two thirds – one province short of a veto. The new constitution had 
an overwhelming support among the Shiite and Kurd communities, as well as 
among a sizeable minority of the Sunni Arabs of Western Iraq.  
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Refer to Figure 4for the results in pictorial representation 
[Anderson, Cannistra and Tobey, 2005] and Table 2 for the tabulated statistics 
[Alexander, 2005 and IEC, 2005 and AP, 2005]. 
 
Figure 4 Constitution Referendum Results – October 2005 (From: Anderson, 
Cannistra and Tobey, 2005_ 
 
The results again showed overwhelming support from the Shiite 
and Kurd groups, with the charter favored by more than 90% of those voting in 
most of their provinces. There is an improvement in Sunni’s voter participation 
when compared with the January results. Many Sunni Arabs had hoped to defeat 
the constitution by rallying two-thirds of the voters in three of Iraq's 18 provinces 
to vote against it -- a veto provision designed to protect Iraq's minorities. They 
came close, winning solid majorities against the constitution in three provinces 
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(Anbar 96%, Salahuddin 81% and Nineveh 55%), but in Nineveh they fell short of 
the two-thirds threshold necessary for defeat in Nineveh by 10%. 
 
Table 2 Constitution Referendum Results – October 2005 
 
Under the terms of the constitution, the country will conduct fresh 
nationwide parliamentary elections on December 15, 2005 to elect a new 
permanent government. 
 





Al-Anbar Ramadi Sunni Majority 3.04 96.96 259,919  32 
Arbil Arbil Kurd Majority 99.13 0.64 830,570  90 
Babil Hilla Shiite Majority 94.56 5.44 543,779 71 72 
Baghdad Baghdad Mix 77.7 22.3 2,120,615  56 
Basra Basra Shiite Majority 96.02 3.98 691,024 48 63 
Dhi Qar Nasiriyah Shiite Majority 97.15 2.85 462,710 67 54 
Diyala Baqouba Mix 51.27 48.73 476,980 34 66 
Douhuk Douhuk Kurd Majority 99.13 0.87 389,198 89 85 
Karbala Karbala Shiite Majority 96.58 3.42 264,674 73 58 
Tamin Kirkuk Mix 62.91 37.09 542,688  79 
Maysan Amara Shiite Majority 97.79 2.21 254,067 59 57 
Muthanna Samawa Shiite Majority 98.65 1.35 185,710 61 58 
Najaf Najaf Shiite Majority 95.82 4.18 299,420 73 56 
Nineveh Mosul Mix 44.92 55.08 718,758  58 
Qadisyah Diwaniyah Shiite Majority 96.74 3.26 297,176 69 56 
Salahudin Tikrit Mix 18.25 81.75 510,152  88 
Sulemaniyah Sulemaniyah Kurd Majority 98.96 1.04 723,723 80 75 
Wasit Kut Shiite Majority 95.7 4.3 280,128 66 54 
Total:   78.59 21.41 9,852,291   
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c. General Election – December 2005  
The January 2005 election treated all of Iraq as a single 
constituency, with representation in the Assembly proportional to the nationwide 
vote. In contrast, in the December 2005 elections each governorate of Iraq will be 
apportioned a number of Assembly seats in proportion to its population, and the 
makeup of each governorate's delegation to the assembly will be proportional to 
the votes cast in that governorate. 
Despite the improved turnout by the Sunni minority who had 
boycotted in the January election, wide voter participation is still desired. Below is 
a statement from the U.N. by Special Representative of the Secretary General in 
Iraq (SRSG) Ashraf Qazi, on the announcement of the final results of the 
referendum – Baghdad, 25 October: “The results of the referendum have 
indicated the degree of political polarization in Iraq. This poses an ongoing 
challenge for all Iraqis and underscores the importance of an inclusive national 
dialogue. Accordingly, it is essential that all of Iraq’s communities fully participate 
in the December elections to ensure their full representation in the Government, 
the Council of Representatives and the Constitutional Review Commission which 
will be established for the express purpose of further broadening the national 
base of support for the fundamental law of the land, i.e. the Constitution.” [SRSG, 
2005] 
7. Iraqi Needs 
To address and define the problem of an election scenario that has issues 
such as poor voter participation and heightened civilian escalation, this thesis 
seek to first identify the needs of the civilian voters involved in the election. 
A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of 
the Iraqi public on the insurgency and the coalition occupation. According to 
Christian Peck of Zogby International, all of the polls seem to consistently find the 
following [Peck, 2005]: 
• A large minority, if not a majority, of Sunni Arabs consider armed 
attacks on U.S. forces legitimate and justified resistance.  
• The greatest support for resistance is in the al-Anbar province.  
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• The majority of Iraqis disapprove of the presence of coalition 
forces.  
• A majority of both Sunnis and Shiites want an end to the occupation 
as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the 
occupation in somewhat greater margins.  
These needs can also be heard from the “cries and voices” interviewed 
from the Iraqi public: 
• “The latest death toll for yesterday's three car bomb attacks was 17 
dead and 10 wounded, most of the casualties were policemen 
guarding the hotels and passers by as well as some worshippers 
who were stepping out of the nearby mosque.” Kamal said 
[Wagner, 2005]. 
• “Why should I care? Nothing has changed since we have elected 
this government: no security, no electricity, no water,” said Saad 
Ibrahim, a Shiite resident of Baghdad's Karrada district who passed 
on voting. “The constitution will not change that. The main issue is 
not getting this constitution passed, but how to stop terrorism.” 
[Keath, 2005a] 
• “There is no doubt that America has interfered in the process, since 
they and the Shiite government are supervising the whole 
operation, and since both want this draft to pass.” al-Kubaisi said 
[Keath, 2005a]. 
• “Whatever happens or will happen in politics has nothing to do with 
the will of the people. It comes from the political elite who run Iraq 
along with the Americans out of the Green Zone in Baghdad,” said 
Zuhair Qassam al-Khashab, a mathematics professor in Mosul who 
voted “no” [Keath, 2005a]. 
From feedback like that above, the general desires from the heart of many 
Iraqis seem to be a secure and safe environment without worry of terrorism. They 
also express the need for freedom in a political system that will maintain their 
own self-ruled government. 
 
C. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Understanding the post war Iraq situation and the needs of the Iraqi, one 
may immediately grasp the complexity of an election support operation in this  
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multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission. The simulation model used in this 
research tries to capture some, but not all, of the following characteristics in the 
Iraqi election scenario. 
1. Insurgency Built-up  
Widespread violent insurgencies began shortly after the invasion of Iraq in 
2003. These insurgencies grew rapidly and relentlessly during the period 
between the occupation and the establishment of a new sovereign Iraqi 
government. “The foreign contingent, said by U.S. officials to be mostly Arabs, is 
widely blamed for dozens of those devastating suicide bombings targeting Shiite 
Muslims and Iraqi security forces. These domestic rebels are mostly aided by 
foreign fighters brought into Iraq by leaders like al-Qaeda or Iraq's Jordanian-
born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to participate in a self-styled ‘holy war’” [Hamza, 
2005a]. 
2. Uncontrollable Multiple Ethnic Groups Dynamics  
With the fall of Saddam’s regime, there is an emergence of new political 
groups with new leaders, bringing different group dynamics onto the political 
table. Energized by the adoption of a new constitution, which passed over Sunni 
objections, key Sunni political parties said this week that they are forming a 
coalition to ensure they have a voice in Iraq's new parliament, to be elected in 
December 2005. Many of the old Sunni leaders are gone, entangled in the 
insurgency, or in jail. These new leaders are hoping that they can begin to 
reverse a political posture that was damaged in part by the January boycott 
[Carroll, 2005]. 
3. Heightened Aggression and Civilian Fear 
Insurgent tactics vary widely, as do their targets. Jihadist elements of the 
insurgency favor the use of car bombs, kidnappings, hostage-taking, shootings 
and other types of attacks to target Iraqi “collaborators” and U.S. forces with little 
regard for civilian casualties [GlobalSecurityOrg, 2005]. These attacks have 




4. Low Voter Participation 
A successful election is a prerequisite to establishing long-standing and 
self-sustaining peace. From the January and October 2005 election results, there 
are still provinces with poor turnout at as low as 32%, like Anbar (32%), Dhi Qar 
(54%) and Wasit (54%). Therefore, strategies and measures to encourage 
civilians to come forward and cast their votes remains a great challenge for the 
U.N and the interim government. 
5. Heightened Anti-Occupation Sentiments 
Polls conducted in June 2005 suggest anti-occupation sentiment has 
increased.  Most alarming to U.S. policymakers is the rising support for the 
insurgency. As mentioned earlier, a 2005 poll by British intelligence found that 
45% of Iraqis support attacks against coalition forces, rising to 65% in some 
areas, and that 82% are “strongly opposed” to the presence of foreign troops. 
Demands for U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's 
Parliament [Rayment, 2005]. 
6. Unprepared Iraqi Forces 
The public has mixed opinions about the growing efficiency and number—
200,000 at present—of Iraq's security forces. “I am extremely pleased with the 
role 2nd Marine Division and our partners in the Iraqi security forces played in 
helping to provide a safe and secure environment for the citizens of al-Anbar to 
go to the polls,” said 2nd Marine Division Commanding General, Maj. Gen. 
Richard A. Huck. “Together we provided security for 139 polling sites, allowing 
every citizen the opportunity to vote.” [Multi-National Force, 2005b]. But some 
U.S. commanders say the Iraqis need 18 months to two years before they will be 
able to fight the insurgency unaided  [Hamza, 2005a]. 
 
D. ASSUMPTIONS 





• The election process will be completed within a single day. 
• The scenario focuses primarily on the admission and crowd control 
aspects of the election organization. The pre-election tasks such as 
logistic support operations (i.e., setup, escort), contingency support 
for conflict resolutions (i.e., bombing, sniper attack), and post-
election support operations will not be studied. 
• There is no distinction between gender and age among the civilian 
voters. The individual civilian’s personality and behavior will be 
represented by the group’s average that the individual civilian 
belonged to. A variance factor will be used in the model to give 
variations to the civilian’s fear, anger and RFA levels within each 
group. 
• The October 2005 referendum result in the representative town is 
used as a basis for defining the population groups, sizes and 
civilian personalities. 
• There is no differentiation of “Yes” and “No” votes. Civilians with 
either of these two elective motivations will be modeled as voters 
with high elective motivation. 
 
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Peacekeeping missions are, by nature, different from conventional combat 
operations. Hence, the following are the non-traditional set of measure of 
effectiveness (MOE) used to evaluate the success of the proposed peacekeeping 
measures: 
1. Percentage of Votes 
This measures the voter participation, in percent (i.e., the number of votes 
cast divided by the total number of registered voters) at the end of the election. It 
is a direct indication of the public voter participation. A good turnout can reflect 
the overall performance of the peacekeeping force that is organizing the election 
support operation both inside and outside the polling center. 
2. Average Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
This measure is the total average amount of civilian aggressiveness 
accumulated during the election process. It is measured as a function of the 
number of attacks and the number of threatening actions performed by the 
civilians, where attacks are weighted with higher severity than threatening 
actions. These attacks and threatening actions are performed by the civilians 
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against soldiers, volunteers and/or other civilians. The level of civilian escalation 
can reflect the peacekeeping force’s ability to manage their tactics, techniques 
and procedures (like rules of engagement) in dealing with conflict resolutions.   
3. Average Civilian Fear 
This measure the average amount of civilian fear present at the end of the 
election process. A very high fear level indicates that the civilians are staying 
away from the election, but even moderate levels of fear may indicate long-term 
effects on the civilians for the future election process. This reflects the inability of 
the peacekeeping force to provide them with a safe and secure environment.  
4. Average Civilian Anger 
This measure is the average amount of civilian anger present at the end of 
the election process. Higher anger levels indicate that the civilians are getting 
more agitated and will be more inclined toward aggressive behaviors. This 
reflects the inability of the peacekeeping force to reduce the intensity of hostility 
in the election environment. Similar to the measure for average civilian fear, 
civilian anger at the end of the simulation will be measured to further study the 
possible long-term effect of this election process on the civilians. 
5. Average Civilian Readiness for Aggression 
This measures the likelihood a civilian will act aggressively. The level of 
civilian escalation increases with the level of readiness for aggression. The ability 
of the peacekeeping force to deal with and resolve conflicts also contributes to 
the level of civilian readiness for aggression. This measure reflects the short-term 
success of the election process. 
6. Number of Performed Actions by Civilians or Soldiers 
There are several hostile actions that the civilians can exhibit during an 
election process. They can threaten and attack either peacekeeping forces or 
other civilians. Therefore, the measures of the number and type of these hostile 
actions will indicate the expected degree of conflict and severity of the situation 
that the military is required to handle during the election process.  
As this is a non-combat based operation where soldiers are armed for 
self-defense only, they can counter the civilians’ hostilities by pacifying, 
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threatening or defending against them. Note that, soldier will only “attack” as a 
defensive measure in response to civilian actions, according to the specific rules 
of engagement. Therefore, the measures of the number and type of these 
engagement actions executed will indicate the expected amount of soldier’s effort 
required to counter them during the election process. 
In the detailed analysis for civilian escalation and voter participation, these 
MOEs can be further categorized according to individuals, groups, and areas of 
concern. Additional measures, such as the proportion of civilians who vote in 
each group, or the proportion of civilian with leading fear and anger in each 
group, can also be derived for better measures of effectiveness. 
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III. BUILDING THE MODEL 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter attempts to address the problems defined in Chapter II.  After 
a brief discussion of several military tactics, techniques and procedures that 
could be used to support the ongoing peacekeeping efforts in Iraq, a brief 
overview of an agent-based modeling platform called PAX is provided.  We then 
describe eight separate hybrid scenarios (chosen to cover the critical areas of 
concern in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous population hierarchy) that 
are investigated in detail in subsequent chapters. Model assumptions and 
limitations are also discussed. 
 
B. PROPOSED MILITARY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES  
1. Secure and Safe Environment 
Enhancing security and safeguarding peace for all Iraqi citizens will enable 
citizens to participate fully in the election process. Achieving a secure and safe 
environment is the immediate priority measure proposed in this thesis. This 
thesis focuses primarily on enforcing physical and psychological security inside 
and outside the polling center in order to ease the fear of the civilians.  
a. Physical Security 
Two layers of a security control region, namely the polling area and 
control area, are proposed for implementation. Each control region has one 
entrance and one exit guarded by the admission control soldiers.  
This implementation aims at providing physical separation between 
motivated voters and civilians who might either instigate conflicts or attempt to 
influence voter’s decisions outside the polling center. The layers of controlled 
regions within the operation area surrounding the polling center should be 
identified and cordoned off from the public. There should be a limited number of 
entrances and exits leading in and out of these controlled regions. The admission 
control soldiers should be placed at each polling center’s entrances and exits to 
inspect every voter. These different layers of controlled regions seek to channel 
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voter movement within the polling center and have the flexibility of withholding 
them at designated areas to minimize any undesired crowd dynamic. Physical 
barricades such as barbed wire, armed soldiers, low and high walls should be set 
up along the perimeter of these controlled regions. These barricades also serve 
to restrict and minimize unnecessary voter interactions inside these controlled 
regions.  
The concern for physical security was demonstrated during the 
October 2005 referendum election. Hundreds of Iraqi police and army troops 
fanned out across Baghdad, setting up checkpoints and fortifying polling stations 
with barbed wire and blast barriers two days ahead of a historic constitutional 
referendum. Iraqi polices were aided by Iraqi soldiers forming a ring around 
polling centers, while U.S. and other coalition troops formed a wider ring, 
according to Lynch [Hamza, 2005b]. 
b. Psychological Security 
The relentless and ongoing insurgency threats instilled fear among 
the general public before the previous elections, especially in the western part of 
Iraq. According to Associated Press, in the Anbar province, “streets and polling 
stations in towns were largely empty as residents remained hunkered in their 
homes, fearing insurgent violence or so embittered they refused to vote.” [Keath, 
2005b]. Apparently, it created some psychological barriers in the civilians, which 
affected their voting participation in the election. To overcome this psychological 
barrier, we consider possible means of promoting voter participation and further 
enhancing the security in the election environment. 
The setup of election booths outside the polling center aim at 
promoting elective motivation. These election booths should be manned by non-
military agencies such as U.N. volunteers, Iraqi civilian volunteers, Iraqi police or 
other neutral forces. Their primary role is to encourage civilians to come forward 
and cast their election votes. Therefore, armed military forces defending and 
threatening actions are not encouraged at these booths. There are several ways 
to attract a civilian’s attention, such as distributing tangible incentive benefits like 
“goodie” bags packed with pro-election pamphlets, food, drink, etc. This measure 
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aims at encouraging voter participation and promoting harmonized election 
sentiment outside the polling center.  
Different sets of ROE for the peacekeeping forces may result in 
different treatment of some or all of the civilians. This treatment has direct 
influence over the ensuing civilian behavior. Therefore, in addition to the election 
booth, proposed psychological security measures include specifying appropriate 
ROEs for peacekeeping forces stationed in different areas of the polling center. 
For example, a more aggressive ROE might be used outside the polling center 
where there are more civilian interactions. A less aggressive ROE might be more 
appropriate inside the polling center where there are more motivated voters. In 
Chapter IV, a total of six ROE sets will be analyzed. 
2. Distribution of Crowd Effect 
According to French sociologist Gustave Le Bon, “contagion theory says 
that crowds exert a hypnotic influence over their members. Shielded by the 
anonymity of a crowd, people abandon personal responsibility and surrender to 
the contagious emotions of the crowd. A crowd thus assumes a life of its own, 
stirring up emotions and driving people toward irrational, perhaps violent action. 
In another view, convergence theory holds that crowd behavior is not a product 
of the crowd itself, but is carried into the crowd by particular individuals. Thus, 
crowds amount to a convergence of like-minded individuals. In other words, while 
contagion theory states that crowds cause people to act in a certain way, 
convergence theory says the opposite that people who wish to act in a certain 
way come together to form crowds.” [Bon, 1895]. 
Therefore, the peacekeeping force must prevent such crowds from 
forming within the area of operation. Measures such as the deployment of mobile 
peacekeeping forces inside and outside the polling center should be considered. 
As mentioned above, controlled regions seek to segregate the voters from the 
crowds. In contrast, mobile forces can move around the area of operation and 
help to identify such crowds and disperse them before they become large and 
agitated enough to instigate any potential hostility. 
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3. Absence of Foreign Troops 
As mentioned in Chapter II, several polls have shown that the majority of 
Iraqi citizens want all foreign troops out of their country immediately. Some 
prominent groups, like IFTU and the Worker’s Council, call for replacement of 
U.S. and British forces with neutral forces from the U.N., the Arab League and 
other nations as a transition.  
This thesis strongly recommends a review to identify what kind of roles, 
and where and how can the Iraqi police, Iraqi military forces, neutral volunteers 
and peacekeeping forces contribute effectively and efficiently for the coming 
election. 
4. Show of Force 
Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian developed the emergent-norm theory of 
crowd dynamics. These researchers concede that social behavior is never 
entirely predictable, but neither are crowds irrational. “If similar interests may 
draw people together, distinctive patterns of behavior may emerge in the crowd 
itself. Emergent-norm theory points out that people in a crowd take on different 
roles. Some step forward as leaders; others become lieutenants, rank-and-file 
followers, inactive bystanders or even opponents.” [Turner and Killian, 1993]. 
Therefore, leadership is a key component that peacekeeping forces can 
attempt to leverage when dealing with crowds or insurgency groups; i.e., 
disturber and trouble-maker groups. In this non-combat peacekeeping 
environment, any military “show of force” should rely primarily on their pressures 
and cooperative relationship with these leaders. Subsequently, the leaders will 
have dominating influences on their followers. For example, the hostile group 
leaders might cooperate with the military by urging their followers to stop any 
hostile actions. This can significantly reduce the fear among other civilians. In 
another example, leaders from those civilian groups that boycotted the last 
election might cooperate with the military by encouraging their followers to 
participate in the election and stay away from the conflict. This could significantly 
improve the voting participation turnout. This thesis proposes to look at the 
impact of the leadership influences on the disturber and trouble-maker groups.  
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Emergence of the group dynamics also depends primarily on individual, 
civilian personalities. Some civilians are less likely to join in hostile behavior 
groups; others may not obey their leadership instructions. Therefore, military 
measures should also consider the variability of the civilian personalities. The 
variability of the civilian personality in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous 
population case will be varied and analyzed. 
 
C. MODELING PLATFORM 
1. Agent-Based Peace Support Operation Model 
Peace support operations focus on providing assistance and de-escalating 
problematic situations, as in an election support operation. Therefore, they 
cannot be modeled adequately with existing combat models that focus on MOEs 
such as force exchange ratios and number of enemy combatants killed.  
“An agent-based modeling approach is appropriate, as it is possible to 
represent the actual situations that are closer to realistic situations. An important 
essence of the term "agent based" in the context of modeling is that real entities 
are correspondingly modeled as entities in the simulation model i.e., aggregated 
or individual. Agent based models are capable of modeling the non-linear effects 
caused by the behavior of individuals and their influences on the emerging 
behavior of groups. Therefore, we are able to trace, understand and assess what 
is happening in the model and compare those results with a comparable real 
situation.” [Schwarz, 2005].  
2. Project Albert and Data Farming 
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory's Project Albert is the research 
and development effort whose goal is to develop the process and capabilities of 
Data Farming. This method addresses questions by applying high performance 
computing to run relatively simple models many times, allowing decision makers 
to examine and better understand the landscape of potential simulated 
outcomes, enhance their intuition, find surprises and outliers, and identify 
potential options.  
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Data Farming is the method by which potentially millions of data points are 
created and captured. It could be considered akin to Data Mining combined with 
feedback, which allows for an intelligent collection of data points.  
The Project Albert modeling approach is achieved through the 
development of a suite of agent-based simulation platforms that facilitate the 
development of relatively simple models (sometimes called distillations). Project 
Albert drives home the point that these models are produced as an intentional 
complement to the very highly-detailed, physics-based simulations being used 
and developed within the DoD. Due to the fact that they are so highly-detailed, 
and changing characteristics within a particular scenario can be very 
cumbersome, they do not permit the examination of a very wide range of 
possibilities and outcomes. In contrast, distillation models are easier to run and 
understand. They have also proven to be effective tools that help capture and 
scientifically reproduce the ideas of Subject Matter Experts, such as those 
thinking about tomorrow's concepts, doctrine, and requirements. The Project 
Albert suite of models includes Map-Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA), 
Socrates, Pythagoras and PAX. This suite of entity-based models has inherent 
strengths and unique capabilities with regard to each aspect of modeling how 
entities think, decide, shoot, move, and communicate [Project Albert, 2005]. 
3. PAX 
The agent-based model chosen for this thesis is PAX, because of its focus 
on peace support operations. PAX was developed by EADS Dornier for the 
German armed forces, initiated and funded by the Bundeswehr TRADOC and 
assisted by the Operations Research Division of the Bundeswehr Center for 
Analyses and Studies.   
PAX concentrates on the modeling of peacekeeping aspects. The main 
effort lies on modeling civilians. PAX enables the user to investigate the effects of 
different actions of the military under certain conditions on the civilian side. PAX 
is able to show dependencies of the soldiers' behavior on the escalation and/or 
de-escalation of the situation. It is not combat or attrition orientated. Therefore, it 
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is more suitable for the analysis of peace support operations like humanitarian 
assistance operations or operations in the context of nation building processes.  
In the application of the model PAX, we will not look only at the results of 
single runs of the simulation. The results of thousands of simulation runs may be 
statistically analyzed, or visualized in fitness landscapes that reveal the success 
of specific strategies and the effects of abilities in a certain context represented 
by parameters that cover important aspects of the situation [Schwarz, 2005]. 
a. Civilian Behavior Model  
PAX was developed with collective inputs from experts in social 
psychology, systems theory, operations research and military advisors, proficient 
in peace support operations. Figure 5(adapted from Schwarz and Erlenbruch, 
2003) illustrates a simplified logic flow of its civilian behavior model.  This shows 
how the leading psychological drivers (such as a civilian’s anger, need and fear) 
may be influenced by external factors from the environment (such as soldiers’ 
actions and behaviors of other civilians). 
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Figure 5 PAX Civilian Behavior Model (Simplified) (After: Schwarz and 
Erlenbruch, 2003 
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In PAX, the civilian group may have leaders. These leaders may 
influence their group members by their presence or via communications. The 
reaction of the group members or the condition of the civilian varies depending 
on how they evaluate the communication contents. 
The civilians' motivations include anger, need, and fear (shown in 
Figure 5), along with election motivation and willingness for cooperation with the 
leader. Other parameters currently available in PAX include readiness for 
aggression, group cohesion, norms for anti-aggression, and the civilian's status 
(leader or normal), as well as the personality variance for fear, anger and 
aggression.  Finally, the civilian’s physical and motivational strength is 
represented by the pushing-strength parameter. In some situations, civilian’s 
personalities are so low that they can hardly move, causing obstruction to other 
civilians from accessing the polling station. In such cases, civilians with higher 
pushing-strength values may push through and change positions with civilians 
having lower pushing-strength values.  
b. Rules of Engagement – Rule Sets 
PAX also has military agents, although the military side of the 
model is not as detailed as the civilian model in regards to the human side of 
their behavior. Soldiers are modeled in an aggregated way. They represent small 
groups of real soldier (e.g., infantry) entities who behave ideally according to 
certain rules.  In this thesis, the term soldier will represent a small group of U.S. 
or U.N. infantry or Iraqi police forces. 
There are no psychological aspects represented in the soldier 
agent's behavior in PAX at the present time. This enables the analyst to clearly 
look at consequences of certain tactics without having to deal with "weaknesses" 
of the human side of the military protagonists. Soldiers are able to communicate 
with the civilians, especially with the leaders. The communication between the 
military and civilians may be looked at as a certain way of giving commands. For 
example, soldiers may tell civilian leaders to leave a critical area together with 
their group [Schwarz, 2005]. 
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The methods and behaviors that govern the soldiers’ 
communication and commanding processes with the civilians are defined by a 
specified set of engagement rules. In PAX, there are currently six sets of 
engagement rules that are governed by the logic shown in Table 3. 
There are two possible behaviors which an individual civilian can 
use when interacting with a soldier, namely “attack” and “threaten.” A civilian may 
choose not to interact with a soldier, but positive interactions are not explicitly 
modeled. There are three possible behaviors that the dominating civilian group 
can exhibit, namely “attack,” “threaten,” or “not aggressive.” The behavioral 
combinations of the individual civilian interacting with a soldier and dominating 
civilian group in the area generate six sets of situations that can occur during the 
simulation run. For example, Situation A arises when the civilian’s behavior is 
“attack” and its dominating group’s behavior is also “attack.” In response to these 
six situations, there are six rule sets available for the soldiers to execute, namely 
1 (PSO Manual), 2, 3, 4 (Gandhi), 5 and 6 (Zero Tolerance).  
 
Situations Civilian/Dominating Group’s Behavior 
A B C D E F 
1 Individual Civilian’s Action: Attack Y Y Y   N 
2 Individual Civilian’s Action: Threaten    Y Y N 
3 Dominating Group’s Action: Attack Y      
4 Dominating Group’s Action: Threaten  Y     
5 Dominating Group’s Action: Not Aggressive    Y N Y  
Rule Set # ROE 
1: “PSO Manual” D T P T P W
2 D T W T W W
3 T T P T P W
4: “Gandhi” P P P P P W
5 T T T T T W
6: “Zero Tolerance” D D D D D W
Legend:   D – Defend,   T – Threaten,   P – Pacify,   W – Wait 
 
Table 3 Rule of Engagement Rule Sets 
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Rule sets that are referred to by names reflect the key principles 
governing the rules. For example, Rule set 1 is also referred to as “PSO Manual” 
where the soldiers engage the civilians with a wider range of actions for each 
appropriate situation much to the “teaching” of the Peace Support Operations 
Manual used by the German Military, for example in Kosovo, in an abstract way 
[Lampe, 2005].  Rule set 4 is commonly known as “Gandhi” strategy, as it 
employs the “always pacify” action at all times.  Rule set 6 is referred to as “Zero 
Tolerance” as the soldiers always defend regardless of civilian’s actions or 
dominating group behavior. Note that once a rule set is assigned to a soldier, the 
soldier will follow this rule set during the entire simulation run.  
An illustrative example of how a soldier’s behavior is governed by 
the rule set in any given situation follows.  If a soldier is assigned Rule set 1 
(PSO Manual), given Situation B, where the civilian’s behavior is “attack” and the 
dominating civilian group’s behavior is “threaten,” the soldier will execute a 
threatening action towards the civilian. Under the same Rule set 1, given a 
Situation C, where the civilian’s behavior is “attack” and the dominating civilian 
group’s behavior is “not aggressive,” the soldier will execute pacifying action 
towards the civilian. 
 
D. BUILDING THE SCENARIOS 
Based on the October 2005 referendum results as shown in Table 2, 
provinces with critical concerns such as low voter participation and high civilian 
escalation are identified for both the homogeneous and heterogeneous 
population scenarios.  
Addressing the concerns, eight hybrid scenarios are derived for both the 
population types where the effects of military tactics, techniques and procedures, 
particularly the execution of security control regions, election booths and civilian 




1. A Representative Iraqi Election Town 
A representative Iraqi election town is modeled in PAX for both the 
homogeneous and heterogeneous population types to aid the analysis on the 
proposed military measures. 
a. General Layout 
The general layout of a representative Iraqi election town used in 
this thesis is illustrated in Figure 6. Another representation of the Iraqi election 
























Figure 6 A Representative Iraqi Election Town 
 
The structural layout in the Iraqi election town and polling center is 
similar for both the homogeneous and heterogeneous population case. The 
differences are the type and distribution of the civilians living in the Iraqi election 
town. For example, in the heterogeneous population scenario, the town consists 
of both Shiite and Sunni civilians, who tend to have similar characteristics and 
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stay close to others within their own group. In the homogeneous population 
scenario, the town consists of Sunni civilians and their distribution is more 
random. 
In PAX, all the motivated civilian voters know where the polling 
point is and will move towards it. Civilians that are fearful will find built-up areas 
and hide in them to shield themselves away from the hostile civilians. Hostile 
civilians will move around the town and instigate conflicts by threatening or 
attacking other civilians and soldiers. There are two types of soldiers, namely 
admission control and reserves, that are each given a specific rule set for 
carrying out their engagement processes. The admission control soldiers can 
only engage the civilians at their assigned checkpoints. The reserves are allowed 
to move within certain proximity from their assigned posts to engage the civilians.  
For a comprehensive guide to PAX, refer to the PAX Users’ Manual 
[Schwarz, 2005] or the thesis titled Evaluating Sunni Participation in an Election 
in a Representative Iraqi Town [Gun, 2005]. 
 
Figure 7 A Representative Iraqi Town (PAX Snapshot) 
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b. Security Control Regions 
Two security control regions are implemented, namely the polling 
and control area as shown in Figure 6and Figure 7. They aim at providing 
physical and psychological security for the civilians and soldiers.  
The polling area forms the inner ring protecting the polling point.  It 
is modeled with a high security measure where it is fortified with high barriers 
such as a high wall and buildings. In PAX, no interaction is allowed across the 
high barrier. The control area forms the outer ring protecting the polling area. It is 
modeled with a lower barrier (representing a low wall, barbed wire, etc.) 
surrounding its perimeter. In PAX, human interaction is allowed across the low 
barriers, but movement is prohibited. 
There is only one entrance and exit in each of the polling and 
control areas. Registered voters’ movements inside the polling center are 
controlled and channeled based on these entrances and exits. At each entrance 
and exit, a checkpoint is set up where admission control soldiers are deployed to 
inspect all voters going in and out of the polling center. Note that only registered 
voters are allowed to enter the polling center via the checkpoints. In addition, the 
admission control soldiers only allow “not aggressive” registered voters to enter 
the polling center. Aggressive registered voters are civilians who have several 
previous records (a threshold value defined in PAX) of threatening and attacking 
behaviors. 
c. Election Booths 
To encourage voter participation, election booths are placed in the 
Iraqi town (outside the control regions) where neutral forces (i.e., U.N. 
volunteers, Iraqi volunteers, and Iraqi police) are deployed to motivate and 
promote elective motivation and harmonize sentiment in the Iraqi town. There are 
different ways this could be accomplished such as distribution of pro-election 
pamphlets, food and drinks to satisfy civilians’ needs, but the model just focuses 
on the interactions between the civilians and neutral forces deployed at the 
booths. Three booths are modeled and are positioned in a “fan-out” pattern to 
cover the civilian movement approaching from the three different directions as 
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shown in Figure 6and Figure 7. In PAX, there are no neutral forces such as Iraqi 
volunteers; therefore, peacekeeping soldiers are deployed at these election 
booths. In order to exhibit and always pacify the less defensive ROE, these 
peacekeeping soldiers are assigned with ROE rule set 4 “Gandhi”. Note that the 
ROE assigned to a group of peacekeeping soldiers remains constant during the 
simulation run.   
2. Homogeneous – Hybrid Scenarios 
Two of the most critical concerns for the December 2005 election are 
voter participation and civilian escalation. From the October 2005 election 
outcomes, homogeneous populated provinces like Anbar (majority Sunni), Wasit 
(majority Shiite) and Dhi Qar (majority Shiite) had the lowest voting turnout rates, 
ranging from only 30% to 50%.  
The Anbar province, with its capital at Ramadi, had the lowest voting 
turnout rate of about 30% and was reported having the most violence during the 
election period. Hence, this thesis will use the election results in Anbar as the 
basis for modeling the homogeneous (Sunni) population scenario. With only 
about a 30% turnout rate, the results in Anbar indicate that the motivated “Yes” 
and “No” voter group is the minority, while bystanders and fearful voters form the 
majority. This voter hierarchy of homogeneous (Sunni) population in Anbar is 
illustrated in Figure 8, while the rest of the civilian group hierarchies remain 
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Figure 8 Voter Hierarchy in Homogeneous (Sunni) Population Hybrid Scenario 
 
a. Scenarios 
Given the voter hierarchy in Figure 8, two of the four possible 
homogeneous population scenarios, as shown in Table 4 are identified. These 
focus attention on the effect of influence by the peacekeeping force on civilian 
leaders in two different groups: the disturber and the trouble-maker group. In 
each of the scenarios, the effect of security control regions and election booths 



























Table 4 Homogeneous (Sunni) Population Hybrid Scenario 
 
A total of four hybrid scenarios are generated for the homogeneous 
(Sunni) populations. For the purpose of easy identification and reference in this 
thesis, these four scenarios are coded with the name listed as follows: 
• Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion: This scenario models the effect 
of disturber group leadership and security control regions in a 
homogeneous Sunni population scenario. 
• Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth: This scenario models the 
effect of disturber group leadership, security control regions and 
election booths in a homogeneous Sunni population scenario. 
• Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion: This scenario models the 
effect of trouble-maker group leadership and security control 
regions in a homogeneous Sunni population scenario. 
• Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth: This scenario 
models the effect of trouble-maker group leadership, security 
control regions and election booths in a homogeneous Sunni 
population scenario. 
b. Layout and Demographic 
The general layout of a representative Iraqi election town for the 
proposed homogeneous (Sunni) population is shown in Figure 9. Figure 10 























Figure 9 Homogeneous (Sunni) Population Scenario Layout 
 
 
Figure 10 Homogeneous (Sunni) Population Scenario Layout in PAX 
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Adopting a conservative worst-case approach, this thesis assumes 
a lower turnout rate of only 20% where 10% of its registered voter populations 
are motivated “Yes” voters, 10% are motivated “No” voters, 70% are bystanders 
and fearful voters, and the remaining 10% are trouble-maker voters.  
Using a scaled down population size of 40 registered voters, the 
following shows the population group breakdown in this homogeneous Sunni 
population hybrid scenario: 
• 28 bystanders and fearful registered Sunni voters, 
• 4 motivated “Yes” registered Sunni voters, 
• 4 motivated “No” registered Sunni voters, 
• 4 trouble-maker registered Sunni voters, and 
• 3 unregistered disturbers. 
Note that the three disturbers are not part of the 40 registered voter 
population and they are not allowed to enter the polling center. This thesis 
assumes there are fewer disturbers than trouble-makers. 
c. Civilian Personalities 
In this homogeneous (Sunni) population hybrid scenario, there are 
five groups of civilians. Each group is modeled with different behaviors 
distinctively differentiated by its individual personality parameter as follows: 
• Initial Fear, 
• Initial Anger, 
• Initial Readiness for Aggression (RFA), 
• Elective Motivation, and 
• Willingness to Cooperate. 
Fear, anger and RFA parameters are civilian personality 
characteristics that change during the simulation run. Their initial values 
represent the civilian’s emotional and psychological state prior to the election 
process. Willingness for cooperation is a parameter that remains constant during 
the simulation run, and its value reflects the civilian’s obedience towards their 
leaders and soldier commands. Elective motivation remains constant during the 
simulation run until the civilian votes, in which case it drops to zero.  The fear 
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level also automatically increases after a civilian has cast his or her vote. This is 
a modeling trick to force the civilian to find a building and stay in it, so that 
civilians will not mingle around the polling center and cause disturbances or other 
interactions that may affect the accuracy of this simulation analysis. 
Three qualitative levels (low, average and high) are used to 
differentiate the personalities of the five civilian groups, as shown in Table 5. As 
will be discussed in Chapter IV, these qualitative levels are converted to 























Table 5 Homogeneous (Sunni) Population Civilian’s Personality 
 
The settings in Table 5 were determined in consultation with 
Professor Abbas, a subject matter expert from the National Security Affairs 
Department in the School of International Graduate Studies at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  
Base on the low turnout rate for the October 2005 election, and the 
most violent outcome in Anbar, it seems clear that disturber and trouble-maker 
groups both had low initial fear, high RFA and low elective motivation. Disturbers 
had high initial anger, though we assume that fewer hard-core insurgents were 
among the trouble-maker group, so this level is average.  
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In contrast, the motivated “Yes” and “No” registered voters had high 
elective motivation and their initial fear, initial anger and initial RFA for 
participating in the election were generally low. Intuitively, the bystander and 
fearful voters had low elective motivation, low initial RFA, and their initial fear and 
initial anger were average: some may support the insurgents, while others might 
be fearful of becoming victims of more insurgency threats.  
Since the effect of leadership influence in motivated voters, 
bystanders and fearful voter groups are not studied in this thesis, their 
willingness for cooperation values are not assigned. The willingness for 
cooperation of the disturber group is low, given that there are more hardcore 
insurgents.  The willingness for cooperation of the trouble-maker group, where 
the majorities are non-violent civilians, is assumed to be average. 
3. Heterogeneous – Hybrid Scenarios 
From the October 2005 election outcomes, heterogeneous populated 
provinces like Diyala, Tamin and Salahudin had the highest voting turnout rates, 
ranging from 70% to 90%. While this high level of voter participation is desirable, 
high civilian conflict and escalation become a critical concern, especially in the 
mixed areas.  
The Tamin province, with its capital at Kirkuk, had one of the highest 
voting turnout rates of about 80%. Hence, this thesis will use the results in Tamin 
to model the heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) population scenario. With about 
80% turnout, the result in Tamin indicated that the majority of its population was 
motivated “Yes” and “No” registered voter group, and that trouble-maker, 
bystander, and fearful voter groups were in the minority.  
This voter hierarchy of heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) population in 
Tamin is illustrated in Figure 11, while the rest of the civilian group hierarchies 



















































Given the voter hierarchy in Figure 11, two of the four possible 
heterogeneous population scenarios as shown in Table 6 are identified.  
Similar to the homogeneous population case, the effect of 
leadership influence on the disturber and trouble-maker group by the 
peacekeeping force can be investigated in this heterogeneous population case. 
In each of the scenario, the effect of security control regions and election booths 

































Table 6 Heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) Population Hybrid Scenario 
 
A total of four hybrid scenarios are generated for the 
heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) populations. For the purpose of easy 
identification and reference in this thesis, these four scenarios are coded with the 
names listed as follows: 
• Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion: This scenario models the effect 
of disturber group leadership and security control regions in a 
heterogeneous Sunni and Shiite/Kurd population scenario. 
• Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth: This scenario models the 
effect of disturber group leadership, security control regions and 
election booths in a heterogeneous Sunni and Shiite/Kurd 
population scenario. 
• Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion: This scenario models the 
effect of trouble-maker group leadership and security control 
regions in a heterogeneous Sunni and Shiite/Kurd population 
scenario. 
• Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth: This scenario models 
the effect of trouble-maker group leadership, security control 
regions and election booths in a heterogeneous Sunni and 
Shiite/Kurd population scenario. 
b. Layout and Demographic 
The general layout of a representative Iraqi election town for the 
proposed heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) population is shown in Figure 12. 
Figure 13 shows the scenario as it appears in the PAX Scenario Editor graphical 
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interface. Adopting the October 2005 election result in Tamin, where a high 
turnout rate of about 80%, this thesis assumes 70% of its registered voter 
populations are motivated “Yes” voters, 20% are motivated “No” voters, and 
remaining 10% are trouble-maker voters. Note that since the bystander and 
fearful voter group constitute only a small minority in the election process, they 























Figure 12 Heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) Population Scenario Layout 
 
Adopting a conservative worst-case approach, this thesis assumes 
50% of the populations are Sunnis and the other 50% are Shiites. With this equal 
proportion between the Sunni and Shiite population, the chances of interactions 
and conflicts between them will be increased, hence render scenarios more likely 
to stress the peacekeeping force’s ability to provide physical and psychological 
security. It is also assumed that all the Shiite/Kurd voters are registered 
motivated “Yes” voters who desire to come forward and participate in the 
election, hence increasing the opportunity for interaction with the Sunnis near or 
at the polling center. The Sunni distribution is as follows, 10% of the 50% Sunni 
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populations are trouble-makers, 20% are motivated “Yes” voters, and the 
remaining 20% are motivated “No” voters. 
 
Figure 13 Heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) Population Scenario Layout in 
PAX 
 
Using a scaled down population size of 39 registered voters, the 
following shows the population group breakdown in this heterogeneous Sunni 
and Shiite/Kurd population hybrid scenario: 
• 20 motivated “Yes” registered Shiite/Kurd voters, 
• 8 motivated “Yes” registered Sunni voters, 
• 8 motivated “No” registered Sunni voters, 
• 3 trouble-maker registered Sunni voters, and 
• 2 unregistered disturbers. 
Note that the three disturbers are not part of the 39 registered voter 
population and they are not allowed to enter the polling center. This thesis 
assumes there are fewer disturbers than trouble-makers. 
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c. Civilian Personalities 
In this heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) population hybrid 
scenario, there are five groups of civilians. The groups are differentiated by the 
same civilian personality parameters that are modeled in the homogeneous 
population scenarios. The levels of these parameters (low, medium, and high) 


























Table 7 Heterogeneous (Sunni, Shiite/Kurd) Population Civilian’s Personality 
 
Once again, the motivated “Yes” and “No” registered voters had a 
high elective motivation, and their initial fear, initial anger and initial RFA for 
participating in the election was generally low.  Note that this scenario has three 
groups of motivated voters, rather than two.  Unregistered disturbers once again 
had low initial fear, high initial anger. Based on the turnout in Tamin for the 
October 2005 election, the registered Sunni trouble-makers are assumed to have 
fewer hardcore insurgents and lower group aggressiveness than the disturbers, 
so they are modeled as having low initial fear and election motivation, but 
average initial anger, RFA, and willingness for cooperation.  
Since the effect of the leadership’s influence in Shiite and Sunni 
motivated voters groups are not studied in this thesis, their willingness for 
cooperation values are not assigned. The willingness for cooperation of the 
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disturber and trouble-maker groups are low and average, respectively, given that 
the disturber group contains more hardcore insurgents, while most of the trouble-
maker group are non-violent civilians. 
E. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Limitations 
The following are the limitations faced during the modeling of the 
scenarios: 
One civilian group’s leader per scenario In the early stages of building this 
model, scenarios where each civilian group had its own leader were explored.  
When escalation levels became high, soldiers could ask all leaders to cooperate 
and persuade their group members to calm down and return back to their homes, 
but could not target the leader of a single civilian group (i.e., that causing the 
commotion). Therefore, only one leader was modeled in each of the eight hybrid 
scenarios, although the leader was alternated between the disturbers and 
trouble-makers to obtain some insight regarding the relative impact of leaders in 
these groups. 
No sympathy and antipathy in civilian model PAX uses a social 
psychological model for the emergence of collective aggression. This is, in 
principle, relatively simple to apply and interpret. For example, the cultural 
background and the circumstances in which a civilian has grown up can be 
modeled by changing the personality parameters (e.g., the norms for anti-
aggression). Not every cultural or social aspect can be modeled in this way. 
Sympathy and antipathy between different civilian groups, and the behaviors 
resulting from these emotions, are an issue that needs further investigation 
[Lampe, 2005]. 
2. Assumptions 
Some modeling assumptions, such as the group sizes and personality 
parameter ranges used in the eight scenarios, have already been discussed. The 
following are other assumptions made during the modeling process: 
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Norms for anti-aggression not modeled Norms for anti-aggression is one 
of the civilian parameters that can be specified in PAX models. These moderate 
the RFA since they represent the circumstances in which individuals have grown 
up with or used to live with in the past. In PAX, these "norms" do not change, 
especially when the scenario process only simulates over a short periods of time, 
therefore they can be assumed as being constant or zero. “Setting these norms 
to zero means that civilians have not learned to solve conflicts without violence, 
and are even more likely to act aggressively. Furthermore, norms for anti-
aggression are usually set fairly low because of the assumption that we model a 
post-war area where people are generally used to seeing and experiencing 
violence.” [Lampe, 2005] Therefore, in this thesis, the norms for anti-aggression 
parameter were set to zero for all civilians in all eight scenarios in order to 
escalate the civilian aggressiveness over the short period of operations for the 
purpose of analyzing the military’s reaction in a more volatile environment.  
Average group cohesiveness All civilian groups are assumed to have 
average group cohesiveness. In PAX, this group cohesiveness parameter 
(ranging from 0 to 100) is set to 50 for all civilians. 
Civilian’s Personality Initial Variance Individual civilian’s initial fear, initial 
anger and initial RFA are modeled with variability ranging between -10 to 10 from 
their group average before the start of the simulation run. 
Civilian’s Personality Randomness Mean deviation for randomness in 
model dynamics is set for civilian fear, anger and RFA ranging from -2 to 2. 
These values influence the simulation runs in that whenever an action is selected 
by an agent the relevant factors are manipulated according to uniform 
distributions with the mean deviations specified. The result is that some civilians 
may be slower or faster to respond to external stimuli than others. 
No PC Fear, No PC Anger In PAX, PC Fear and PC Anger define the 
tendency for civilian fear and anger to increase over time. Since the variability 
and randomness of the civilian fear, anger and RFA are modeled during the 
simulation run, these features will not be activated.  A civilian’s fear and anger 
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may increase during the run based on interactions with other civilians or soldiers, 
or the prevailing sentiments of the crowd. 
No decrease of anger on success In PAX, specifying a decrease of anger 
on success allows the civilian’s anger to drop by a certain amount once the 
civilians have successfully cast their votes. This decrease may reduce their 
aggressiveness. This study assumes that a civilian’s anger cannot be decreased 
immediately after they cast a vote, but that such a decrease would only happen 
after the election is over, if at all. 
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IV. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGIES AND RESULTS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The analysis methodologies employed in this thesis exploit the statistical 
theory on design of experiments (DOE) that are developed specifically for 
exploring computer models such as PAX. The DOE factors, levels and design (in 
specific, the Near Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design), defined for this 
research’s experiments will be discussed.  
The statistical software package JMP (SAS Institute, 2005) will be used to 
interpret and analyze the collected data. Several JMP statistical tools are used to 
present the experiments’ results and to identify significant factors that could lead 
to insights for the proposed military tactics, techniques and procedures 
experimented in all the eight hybrid scenarios. 
 
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS (DOE) 
In the context of DOE, an input or parameter in simulation model such as 
Civilian’s Initial Fear is referred as a factor. A factor can be either qualitative or 
quantitative. For an example, in PAX, soldiers can be assigned to exercise one of 
six particular rule sets describing the rules of engagement, so Rule Set is a 
qualitative factor. Factors such as Initial Fear, Initial Anger and Initial RFA, 
defining the personality of a civilian, are continuous quantitative factors. Each 
factor can be set to two or more values called factor levels. These levels are 
typically coded numerically for analysis purposes. A scenario or design point is a 
combination of levels for all factors. In stochastic simulations, replicates mean 
that different pseudo-random numbers are used to simulate the same scenario 
[Kleijnen et al., 2005].  
In practice, computer simulation models, such as PAX, often contain a 
large number of factors that the user could vary, via trial-and-error or designed 
experiments, to study how the simulation behaves. For example, in PAX, each 
civilian has about 14 factors (such as Initial Fear, Initial Anger, Initial RFA and 
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Elective Motivation) that the user can set to distinguish each civilian agent. Each 
of these factors has factor levels ranging from 0 to 100. To examine all possible 
combinations of these factor levels—even for a single agent—would require 
octillion (i.e., 1027) of design points. Some might think it would be excellent if 
experiments could execute all the possible design points. However, it is not 
practical to implement this full set of experiments due to limitations such as 
computing resources and time.  Fortunately, there are efficient designs that can 
be employed in these situations.  The NOLH design is employed to minimize the 
large number of experiments. 
1. Design Factors  
In each of the four homogeneous population hybrid scenarios, five civilian 
groups and two soldier groups are modeled. These groups are listed and coded 
with names for the purpose of referencing as follows: 
• Bystander and Fearful Sunni Registered Voters (HomoCiv1) 
• Motivated “Yes” Sunni Registered Voters (HomoCiv2) 
• Motivated “No” Sunni Registered Voters (HomoCiv3) 
• Trouble-Maker Sunni Registered Voters (HomoCiv4) 
• Disturber Unregistered Voters (HomoCiv5) 
• Poll Area Admission Control Soldiers (HomoPollSol) 
• Control Area Admission Control Soldiers (HomoCtrlSol) 
The 24 factors described in Chapter III that are appropriate for this 
research experiment in a homogeneous population scenario are listed as follows: 
• Initial Fear (For HomoCiv1 to HomoCiv5) 
• Initial Anger (For HomoCiv1 to HomoCiv5) 
• Initial Readiness For Aggression (RFA) (For HomoCiv1 to 
HomoCiv5) 
• Elective Motivation (For HomoCiv1 to HomoCiv5) 
• Willingness for Cooperation (For either HomoCiv4 or HomoCiv5) 
• Poll Area ROE (For HomoPollSol) 
• Control Region ROE (For HomoCtrlSol) 
• Personality Variance (Common setting for Initial Fear, Anger and 
RFA) 
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Similarly, in each of the four heterogeneous population hybrid scenarios, 
five civilian groups and two soldier groups are modeled. These groups are listed 
and coded with names for the purpose of referencing as follows: 
• Motivated Shiite/Kurd Registered Voters (HeterCiv1) 
• Motivated “Yes” Sunni Registered Voters (HeterCiv2) 
• Motivated “No” Sunni Registered Voters (HeterCiv3) 
• Trouble-maker Sunni Registered Voters (HeterCiv4) 
• Disturber Unregistered Voters (HeterCiv5) 
• Poll Area Admission Control Soldiers (HeterPollSol) 
• Control Area Admission Control Soldiers (HeterCtrlSol) 
Similarly, a total of 24 factors described in Chapter III that are appropriate 
for this research experiment in a heterogeneous population scenario are listed as 
follows: 
• Initial Fear (For HeterCiv1 to HeterCiv5) 
• Initial Anger (For HeterCiv1 to HeterCiv5) 
• Initial Readiness For Aggression (RFA) (For HeterCiv1 to 
HeterCiv5) 
• Elective Motivation (For HeterCiv1 to HeterCiv5) 
• Willingness for Cooperation (For either HeterCiv4 or HeterCiv5) 
• Poll Area ROE (For HeterPollSol) 
• Control Region ROE (For HeterCtrlSol) 
• Personality Variance (Common setting for Initial Fear, Anger and 
RFA) 
2. Design Factor Levels 
With reference to Table 5 and Table 7 as shown in Chapter III, the 
following are the design factor levels defined for the civilians’ personalities and 
soldiers’ ROEs to be experimented in this research: 
• Low Personality (Value ranging from 10 to 30) 
• Average Personality (Value ranging from 40 to 60) 
• High Personality (Value ranging from 70 to 90) 
• Civilian Personality Variance (Value ranging from  -10 to 10) 
• Soldier ROE (Value ranging from 1 to 6) 
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In the experiment, Admission Control soldiers deployed in Poll and Control 
Areas are assigned with ROE that are varied from rule set one to six. This 
permits the analysis of ROE that best yield desired election outcome in each 
area given different election scenarios. 
Note that the Civilian Personality Variance factor level ranges from -10 to 
10; hence, the low and average personality factor levels can overlap, as can the 
average and high levels.. For example, if there are eight civilians in a group and 
the average Initial Fear in the group is Low (i.e., value ranging from 10 to 30), 
with the Civilian Personality Variance factor levels ranging from -10 to 10, PAX 
will set each of the eight civilians in the group with Initial Fear factor level ranging 
from 0 to 40 randomly, giving a maximum overlap of 10 between the Low and 
Average Personality factor levels. These overlaps are allocated to facilitate the 
analysis of variability in civilian’s personalities that may contribute significant 
insights to the scenario outcome.  
3. Near Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) Design 
The number of factors designed for the experiment of this research is 
considered relatively large, particularly since each factor has many possible 
levels. With constraints in computing resources and time, the number of 
simulation runs must be fixed and limited. Under such a situation, a nearly 
orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) design is recommended [Kleijnen et al., 
2005].  
The salient characteristics of NOLH design include good space-filling and 
near orthogonality properties. Hence, the NOLH design is used to generate the 
design points required for this research experiment. To facilitate the use of these 
designs, the NOLH Design spreadsheet [Sanchez, 2005], adopted from the 
designs developed by Cioppa [Cioppa, 2002; see also Cioppa and Lucas, 2006], 
is used where low and high levels for each design factor are easily entered and 
design points are generated automatically by the spreadsheet.  
In this research experiment, each of the eight hybrid scenarios have a 24-
factor experiment with a total of 257 design points generated by the NOLH 
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Design spreadsheet. A snapshot of the NOLH Design spreadsheet, provided in 
Figure 14, shows part of the 257 design points generated for the 
Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion scenario. 
 
Figure 14 NOLH Design Spreadsheet 
 
The correlation of the generated design is analyzed and the resulting 
correlation matrix is shown in Figure 15. We observed that the correlation 
coefficients between any two factors are very low, with magnitudes not 
exceeding 0.053. This result indicates good orthogonality in the generated NOLH 
design even though some factors were rounded. The same steps were used to 
generate the NOLH design and correlation matrix for the remaining seven hybrid 
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scenarios. Similarly, the remaining seven designs also have orthogonality 
behavior, with the highest magnitude of the correlation between any two factors 
not exceeding 0.053. 
Each design point is replicated 30 times using different random numbers, 
so each hybrid scenario has 30(257)=7,710 runs. In total, 61,680 simulation runs 
are made to explore all the eight hybrid scenarios of interest in this research. 
 
 
Figure 15 Correlation Matrix 
 
C. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENTS TO GENERATE DATA 
The preparation process for setting up the production runs in PAX requires 
three stages. The first stage creates all eight hybrid scenarios using the PAX 
Scenario Editor. A Scenario Basecase file will be created for each hybrid 
scenario. In stage two, these Scenario Basecase files are read by the PAX 
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Experiments Editor one at a time, where the respective Experiment Study file is 
generated. In the final stage, the Experiment Study file is edited to extract the 
DOE design factors and levels from the NOLH Design spreadsheet. For a 
comprehensive guide to PAX, refer to the PAX Users’ Manual [Schwarz, 2003]. 
With the completion of the above three stages, a total of eight sets of 
experiments were created. Production runs are prepared and executed to 
simulate all the 61,680 runs using the PAX “oldmcdata.start.bat” application. 
After the completion of the production runs, the generated simulation results are 
post-processed using PAX “paxPP.bat” application. The end product of this 
“paxPP.bat” application is a comma delimited (csv) formatted file containing the 
simulation results (i.e., number of votes, average civilian fear, etc) of all the 
excursions. For details about running these commands, refer to User’s Guide, 
OldMcData – The Data Farmer, version 1.0 [Upton, 2004]. 
Note that for reference purposes, these eight sets of experiments are 
labeled with the same naming convention used earlier for naming the eight hybrid 
scenarios. 
JMP 5.1 is used to interpret and analyze these eight sets of raw results. 
For each set of results, the raw data are summarized over replications, and the 
resulting 257 rows of mean statistical results are used for further analysis. The 
advantages of using JMP 5.1 include, but are not limited to, the ability to collate a 
huge amount of raw data and tabulate them into a structural and easy-to-read 
format. It also provides a user-friendly graphical interface for constructing 
distribution plots, contour plots, and interaction plots, etc., that make analysis 
simpler. Powerful statistical analysis tools, such as regression tree analysis, 
model fitting, and prediction profiler analysis, etc., are also available to make in-
depth statistical analysis easy. Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the legends used in 
the data distribution plots [SAS, 2003].  
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Figure 16 JMP Outlier Box Plot Legend 
 
Note that after the raw data files are first imported into JMP, the ROE 
factors for Admission Control Soldiers and Reserve Soldiers are defined as a 
Nominal modeling type. This step is important, as it distinguishes the ROE 
factors as qualitative design factors with multiple categorical levels. JMP is then 
able to automatically handle these nominal factors appropriately in subsequent 
graphical and statistical analyses. The rest of the design factors and run outputs 
are, by default, defined to be of the Continuous modeling type when they are 
imported into JMP. 
 
Figure 17 JMP Quantile Box Plot and Quantiles Table Legend 
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The following analysis steps are used to draw results and conclusions 
where significant factors for various MOEs are identified. These could provide 
insights regarding the proposed military tactics, techniques and procedures 
experimented in all eight hybrid scenarios: 
• Data Distribution Analysis 
• Regression Tree Analysis 
• Model Fitting Analysis using Stepwise Linear Regression where R2 
and p-values are considered 
• Prediction Profiler Analysis 
D. HOMO+DISTURBERLEAD+CTRLREGION RESULTS 
The results for the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario follow.  
Recall that this is one of the scenarios where low voter turnout and high 
escalation are likely. 
1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The final voting participation from the civilian voters in any scenario 
is often affected by the situations, such as conflicts, that occurred during the 
election proceeding. The dynamics of these evolving situations have direct 
influences on the civilian’s behaviors and military measures.  Therefore, the final 
percentage of votes cast at the end of the election is measured. Figure 18 shows 
the distribution of voter participation, in percent (i.e., the number of votes cast 
divided by the total number of registered voters) at the end of the election 
simulation. 
 
Figure 18 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Voter Participation 
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This scenario corresponds to a town with a homogeneous Sunni 
population that had one of the lowest voting turnout rates for the October 2005 
election. The simulation results show an average voter participation of about 
15.5% with a standard deviation of about 2.6%. This result suggests that the 
simulation results are fairly consistent with the real-world results. The distribution 
of the results shown by the shortest half bracket (i.e., showing the densest 50% 
of the observations) indicates that the civilian voting participation varies over a 
large range. The fact that the distribution has a wide spread with highest 
percentage of vote at 20% and lowest at 8.8% shows that at least some factors 
may make a difference. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Aggregated civilian escalation refers to the value of the civilian 
escalation accumulated over the entire election simulation. The amount of 
threatening and attacking actions demonstrated by civilians against other 
civilians and soldiers are contributing to this measure of civilian escalation.  Note 
that each threatening and each attacking action respectively contributes to the 
two and ten values of the accumulated civilian escalation.  
Figure 19 shows the distribution of the civilian escalation 
accumulated in the scenario over the entire election simulation. The distribution 
of civilian escalation demonstrated against other civilians is illustrated in Figure 
20. The distribution of civilian escalation demonstrated against the soldiers is 
illustrated in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 19 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
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The aggregated civilian escalation results in this scenario have a 
mean value of about 367.3 units (i.e., threatening or attacking actions). The 
aggregated civilian escalation against other civilians has a mean value of about 
286 units (about 78% of the total escalation). The mean aggregated civilian 
escalation against the soldier has a mean value of about 81.4 units (about 22% 
of the total escalation). This result indicates that the majority of the escalation is 
among the civilians. This is an undesirable situation during an election. 
 
Figure 20 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
(Civilians against other Civilians) 
 
Figure 21 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
(Civilians against Soldiers) 
 
c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The effectiveness of the proposed military measures is primarily 
reflected in the resulting civilian’s emotional and psychological states developed 
at the end of the election proceeding, averaged across all the civilians. The 
higher fear level indicates that the civilians are staying away from the election. 
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However, the reader must be informed that PAX will automatically increase the 
fear level of the civilians once they have cast their votes successfully, so that the 
civilians will move back to their homes after casting their votes and not mingle 
inside the voting area. Therefore, the reported high fear level may be overstated, 
especially in scenarios where many civilians vote. This thesis does not attempt to 
separate these two aspects and will assume the reader is aware of this 
overstated fear level from this point onwards. The higher anger level indicates 
that the civilians are getting more agitated and will be inclined toward aggressive 
behaviors. The likelihood that a civilian will act aggressively depends on their 
level of RFA. Therefore, it is important to analyze how these civilian’s 
personalities have evolved over the entire election proceeding. 
The distribution of the civilian average fear, anger and RFA levels 
at the end of the election simulation are illustrated in Figure 22, Figure 23 and 
Figure 24. A contour plot is shown in Figure 25 to illustrate the relationships 
between these three civilian personalities. Note that the maximum value for each 








Figure 23 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Anger 
 
The average civilian fear and anger levels are high, with mean 
values of about 87 to 88 units. This result indicates that, on average, the civilians 
are fearful and angry. However, the average RFA level has a much lower mean 
value of about only 30 units. This suggests that on an average, the civilians may 
be angry and agitated at times but they are not likely to act aggressively. 
 
 





Figure 25 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Fear, Anger and 
RFA Contour Plot 
 
From the contour plot, it can be observed that the highest levels of 
civilian RFA occur mostly when the civilian anger level is very high regardless of 
the civilian fear level.  However, no obvious scattering pattern is observed. 
2. Regression Tree Analysis 
Main effects are analyzed in a regression tree analysis that helps to 
identify significant factors contributing to the various MOEs defined. The 
Percentage of Votes and Aggregated Civilian Escalation are the two primary 
MOEs that will be addressed. 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of the 
regression tree shown in Figure 26. This partition yields an R2 value of 0.438, 
and indicates that the following design factor levels characterize those 
excursions where a high percentage of votes are observed: 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (<26) 
• Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation (>=75) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear (<56) 
• Civilian Personality Variance (<7) 
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The effect of Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (>=26) 
factor has solely contributed in causing a low percentage of votes cast. 
 
Figure 26 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Vote Percentage Regression Tree 
 
The Elective Motivation of the Civ3-Sunni “No” Voter has shown up 
as a key factor. Note that this thesis has modeled both the Sunni “Yes” and “No” 
Voters with similar personalities and population size, hence their results can be 
interpreted interchangeably. In this case, the fact that election motivation shows 
up for Sunni “No” Voters but not for Sunni “Yes” Voters is perhaps due to the fact 
that their initial locations are nearer to the polling center. This could indicate the 
benefit of having the first to arrive at the polls be highly motivated.  
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The regression tree for accumulated civilian escalation yields an R2 
value of 0.739, as shown in Figure 27, and indicates that the following design 
factor levels characterize those excursions where low aggregated civilian 
escalation is observed: 
 
70 
• Control Soldier ROE (Set 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger (<47) 
If Control Soldier ROE (Set 4 “Gandhi”) is used, then escalation is 
highest if the troublemakers have low election motivation. If the control soldiers 
use any other rule set and the bystanders are angry (>=47), then escalation is 
slightly higher when they are not fearful (Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter 
Fear < 47) then when they are fearful. Once again, the bystanders affect the 
outcome of the election. 
 
Figure 27 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Regression Tree 
 
3. Model Fitting Analysis 
Stepwise linear regression was performed to establish the relationship 
between the design factors and the responses generated in the simulation. The 
Percentage of Votes and Aggregated Civilian Escalation are the two primary 
responses that will be addressed in this analysis. 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of this 
model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for analysis, the “best” 
model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting with the main 
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effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 value of 0.73 
and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.055) were obtained. Refer to 
Figure 28 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the regression tree 
were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity and equal 
variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of non-linearity 
and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the average civilian 
escalation is generated as follows: 
Percentage of Votes Cast = 13.04 – 0.06(Civ1F) + 0.03(Civ1A) – 
0.19(Civ1R) – 0.05(Civ2A) – 0.08(Civ3A) + 0.15(Civ3E) – 0.21(CivPV) – 
0.17(PollROE) + 0.02(Civ1F-50.01)(Civ1R-20.01) + 0.03(Civ1F-50.01)(CivPV-
5.0) – 0.01(Civ1A-50.01)(Civ1R-20.01) – 0.02(Civ1A-50.01)(CivPV-5.0) + 
0.01(Civ3A-20.01)(Civ3E-80.01) – 0.01(Civ1F-50.01)(Civ1F-50.01) - 0.01(Civ1R-
20.01)(Civ1R-20.01) – 0.01(Civ3E-80.01)(Civ3E-80.01) 
Where: Civ1F = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear 
Civ1A = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA 
Civ2A = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter Anger 
Civ3A = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Anger 
Civ3E = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {2&3&6 – 1&4&5} 
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Figure 28 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Vote Percentage Model Fit 
 
Positive coefficients indicate that the terms tend to increase the 
MOE, while negative coefficients indicate that the terms tend to decrease the 
MOE. Interaction terms can amplify or diminish the impact of main effects. 
Quadratic terms indicate the curvature in the relationships. 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped Poll Area Soldier’s ROE 
Set 2, 3 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the response 
that is different from Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 1, 4 and 5 (with value -1). 
From the metamodel, the Civ1R and Civ3E terms stand out 
statistically from the rest with higher t ratio values.  This agrees with the 
regression tree results.  Overall, the result indicates that when the level of RFA 
among Civ1 (Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voters) increase, the percentage of 
votes will decrease. This is not a desirable outcome, as we want the percentage 
of votes to be high. In contrast, if the level of elective motivation among Civ3 
(Sunni “No” Voters) increases, the percentage of votes will increase. This is a 
desirable outcome, as we want the percentage of votes to be high.  
Since there are interaction and quadratic terms in the metamodel, 
the change in the main effects may affect the interactions and hence the overall 
results. Numerical examples that include the interactions using JMP Profiler 
Analysis tool will be discussed in Chapter V. 
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b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The civilian escalation accumulated during the entire simulation is 
the response of this model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for 
analysis, the “best” model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting 
with the main effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 
value of 0.76 and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.02) were obtained. 
Refer to Figure 29 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the 
regression tree were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity 
and equal variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of a 
non-linearity and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the 
average civilian escalation is generated as follows: 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation = -121.39 – 3.1(Civ1F) + 
2.68(Civ1A) + 2.37(Civ2R) + 1.67(Civ3R) + 3.74(Civ4R) + 2.58(Civ5R) – 
15.52(PollROE) – 128.83(CtrlROE) – 3.64(CtrlROE-0.60)(Civ1F-50.01) 
Where: Civ1F = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear 
Civ1A = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ3R = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter RFA 
Civ4R = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter RFA 
Civ5R = Civ5 – Disturber RFA 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {2&5&6 – 1&3&4} 
CtrlROE = Control Soldier ROE {1&2&3&5&6 – 4} 
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Figure 29 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Model Fit 
 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped Poll Area Soldier’s ROE 
Set 2, 5 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the response 
that is different from Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 1, 3 and 4 (with value -1). 
Similarly, it has grouped Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 together 
(with value 1) as having the same effect on the response that is different from 
Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 4 (with value -1). 
From the metamodel, the CtrlROE terms stands out statistically 
from the rest with a very high t ratio value.  Overall, the result indicates that when 
Control Area Admission Control Soldier employ ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, the 
level of aggregated civilian escalation will decrease. This is excellent, as we want 
the civilian escalation to be minimized.  
 
E. HOMO+DISTURBERLEAD+CTRLREGION+BOOTH RESULTS 
The results for the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth follow.  Recall 
that this is one of the scenarios where low voter turnout and high escalation are 
likely. 
1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
In this experiment, the deployments of Election Booths are 
implemented. The purpose of deploying these Election Booths is to promote 
election motivation and encourage voter participation, so that the percentage of 
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votes is measured to evaluate the success rate of this implementation. Figure 30 
shows the distribution of voter participation, in percent (i.e., the number of votes 
cast divided by the total number of registered voters) at the end of the election 
simulation.  
This scenario corresponds to a town with a homogeneous Sunni 
population that had one of the lowest voting turnout rates for the October 2005 
election. The simulation results show an average voter participation of about 
17.7% with a standard deviation of about 2.5%. This result suggests that the 
simulation results are fairly consistent with the real-world results. The distribution 
of the shortest half bracket (i.e., showing the densest 50% of the observations) 
indicates that the civilian voting participation varies over only a small range. The 
fact that the distribution has a wide spread with highest percentage of vote at 
20% and lowest at 9.2% shows that at least some factors may make a difference. 
Similar results can be observed from the quantile box plot, where the majority of 
the data is skewed towards the right. 
 
Figure 30 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Voter Participation 
 
Compared with the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario, the 
voting participation in this Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario, 
where Election Booths are implemented, shows an improvement of about 2.2% 
on average with a tighter standard deviation of 1%. Tighter voting participation 
distribution towards the high side is also observed in this scenario. 
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b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Figure 31 shows the distribution of the civilian escalation 
accumulated in the scenario over the entire election simulation. The distribution 
of civilian escalation demonstrated against other civilians is illustrated in Figure 
32. The distribution of civilian escalation demonstrated against the soldiers is 
illustrated in Figure 33. 
The aggregated civilian escalation resulted in this scenario has a 
mean value at about 1234.7 units (i.e., threatening or attacking actions). The 
aggregated civilian escalation against other civilians has a mean value of about 
406 units (about 33% of the total escalation). The mean aggregated civilian 
escalation against the soldier has a mean value of about 828.7 units (about 67% 
of the total escalation). This result indicates a huge increase in civilian escalation 
that developed in the scenario (where Election Booths are deployed). Intuitively, 
this increase escalation is definitely an undesirable situation. 
 
 





Figure 32 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation (Civilians against other Civilians) 
 
 
Figure 33 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation (Civilians against Soldiers) 
 
Surprisingly, this results indicate that the majority of the time, the 
escalation is between the civilians and soldiers. This is completely the opposite 
as compared to the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario where no Election 
Booths were deployed. Together with the improvement in the voting participation, 
this result suggests that the implementation of the Election Booths had managed 
to attract the hostile civilians towards them and minimized the interactions among 
the civilians. Therefore, this allowed more motivated civilians to participate in the 




c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The distributions of the civilian average fear, anger and RFA level 
at the end of the election proceeding, averaged across all the civilians are 
illustrated in Figure 34, Figure 35 and Figure 36. A contour plot is shown in 
Figure 37 to illustrate the relationships between these three civilian personalities. 
Note that the maximum value for each factor is 100 units. 
The average civilian fear and anger levels are high, with mean 
values of about 78 and 86 units. This result indicates that, on average, the 
civilians are fearful and angry. However, the average RFA level has a much 
lower mean value of about only 32 units. This suggests that on an average, the 
civilians may be angry and agitated at times but they are not likely to act 
aggressively.  
 
Figure 34 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Fear 
 
Note that the civilian fear level has dropped by 10 units as 
compared to the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario where no Election 
Booths are deployed. This suggests that the Election Booths deployed in this 
scenario are gaining positive responses from the civilians. On an average, 
civilians are now less fearful and are coming out from their homes to participate 
in the election. 
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Figure 35 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Anger 
 
 
Figure 36 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian RFA 
 
From the contour plot, it can be observed that the highest levels of 
civilian RFA occur mostly when the average civilian fear level is low and the 
anger level is very high. It is also observed that when the average civilian fear 
level is very high, the amount of average civilian RFA is always low regardless of 
the average civilian anger level. This suggests that on an average, the civilian 
fear may be a significant factor contributing to the low civilian RFA. 
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Figure 37 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Fear, 
Anger and RFA Contour Plot 
 
2. Regression Tree Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of the 
regression tree shown in Figure 38. This partition yields an R2 value of 0.404, 
and indicates that the effect of the Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voters Elective Motivation 
(>=80) design factors has solely contributed to the high voter participation in 
those excursions where a high percentage of votes are observed. 
The effects of the following are the design factors that have 
contributed in causing a low percentage of votes cast: 
• Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation (<80) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger (>=49) 
• Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Anger (>=23) 
81 
 
Figure 38 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Vote Percentage 
Regression Tree 
 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The regression tree for accumulated civilian escalation yields an R2 
value of 0.644, as shown in Figure 39, and indicates that the following design 
factor levels characterize those excursions where low aggregated civilian 
escalation is observed: 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (<26) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear (<51) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger (<46) 
• Civilian Personality Variance (<7) 
The effect of the Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (>=26) 
factor has solely contributed in causing high civilian escalation. Once again, the 
bystanders affect the outcome of the election. 
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Figure 39 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation Regression Tree 
 
3. Model Fitting Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of this 
model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for analysis, the “best” 
model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting with the main 
effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 value of 0.74 
and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.05) were obtained. Refer to 
Figure 40 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the regression tree 
were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity on the selected 
model indicated an absence of non-linearity problems. Although there was some 
evidence of heteroskedacity, regression estimates are unbiased even when the 
error variance is not constant. So the regression metamodels can still be used to 
identify important terms. The metamodel for predicting the average civilian 
escalation is generated as follows: 
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Figure 40 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Vote Percentage Model Fit 
 
Percentage of Votes Cast = 10.85 + 0.14(Civ1F) - 0.13(Civ1A) – 
0.15(Civ1R) – 0.04(Civ2A) – 0.08(Civ3A) + 0.17(Civ3E) – 0.20(CivPV) – 
0.20(PollROE) + 0.01(Civ1F-50.01)(Civ1R-20.01) - 0.01(Civ1F-50.01)(Civ3E-
80.01) – 0.01(Civ1A-50.01)(Civ1R-20.01) + 0.02(Civ1A-50.01)(Civ3E-80.01) + 
0.01(Civ3A-20.01)(Civ3E-80.01) 
Where: Civ1F = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear 
Civ1A = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA 
Civ2A = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter Anger 
Civ3A = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Anger 
Civ3E = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {1&2&3&4&6 – 5} 
 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped Poll Area Soldier’s ROE 
Set 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 5 (with value -1). 
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From the metamodel, the Civ1R and Civ3E terms stand out 
statistically from the rest with higher t ratio values. This agrees with the 
regression tree results.  Overall, the results indicate that when the level of RFA 
among Civ1 (Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voters) increase, the percentage of 
votes will decrease. This is not desirable, as we want the percentage of votes to 
be high. On the contrary, if the level of elective motivation among Civ3 (Sunni 
“No” Voters) increase, the percentage of votes increase. This is preferred, as we 
want the percentage of votes to be high. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The civilian escalation accumulated during the entire simulation is 
the response of this model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for 
analysis, the “best” model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting 
with the main effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 
value of 0.71 and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.06) were obtained. 
Refer to Figure 41 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the 
regression tree were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity 
and equal variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of 
non-linearity and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the 
average civilian escalation is generated as follows: 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation = -2121.70 + 28.0(Civ1F) – 
21.42(Civ1A) + 30.21(Civ1R) + 7.01(Civ4A) + 12.54(Civ4R) + 10.65(Civ5R) + 
14.08(CivPV) – 28.84(PollROE) – 3.5(Civ1F-50.01)(Civ1R-20.01) – 4.15(Civ1F-
50.01)(CivPV-5.0) + 2.64(Civ1A-50.01)(Civ1R-20.01) + 4.53(Civ1R-
20.01)(Civ1R-20.01) 
Where: Civ1F = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear 
Civ1A = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA 
Civ4A = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter Anger 
Civ4R = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter RFA 
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Civ5R = Civ5 – Disturber RFA 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {1&4&5&6 – 2&3} 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped Poll Area Soldier’s ROE 
Set 1, 4, 5 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 2 and 3 (with value -
1).  
 
Figure 41 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation Model Fit 
 
From the metamodel, the Civ1F and Civ1R terms stand out 
statistically from the rest with higher t ratio values. Overall, the results indicate 
that when the levels of fear and RFA among Civ1 (Sunni Bystander and Fearful 
Voters) increase, the level of aggregated civilian escalation will increase. This is 
not preferred, as we want the escalation to be low.  
 
F. HOMO+TROUBLEMAKERLEAD+CTRLREGION RESULTS 
The results for the Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion follow. Recall 





1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
Figure 42 shows the distribution of voter participation, in percent 
(i.e., the number of votes cast divided by the total number of registered voters) at 
the end of the election simulation. 
This scenario corresponds to a town with a homogeneous Sunni 
population that had one of the lowest voting turnout rates for the October 2005 
election. The simulation results show an average voter participation of about 
15.4% with a standard deviation of about 2.7%. This result suggests that the 
simulation results are fairly consistent with the real-world results. The distribution 
of the shortest half bracket (i.e., showing the densest 50% of the observations) 
indicates that the civilian voting participation varies over a large range. The fact 
that the distribution has a wide spread with highest percentage of vote at 20% 
and lowest at 8.3% shows that at least some factors may make a difference. 
 
Figure 42 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Voter Participation 
 
Comparing with the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario, the 
voting participation in this Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion scenario (where 
both the scenarios do not have Election Booths deployed) shows very similar 
results. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Figure 43 shows the distribution of the civilian escalation 
accumulated in the scenario over the entire election simulation. The distribution 
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of civilian escalation demonstrated against other civilians is illustrated in Figure 
44. The distribution of civilian escalation demonstrated against the soldiers is 
illustrated in Figure 45. 
The aggregated civilian escalation that resulted in this scenario has 
a mean value of about 361.8 units (i.e., threatening or attacking actions). The 
aggregated civilian escalation against other civilian has a mean value of about 
280.5 units (about 78% of the total escalation). The mean aggregated civilian 
escalation against the soldier has a mean value of about 81.3 units (about 22% 
of the total escalation). This result indicates that the majority of the escalation is 
among the civilians. This is an undesirable situation during an election.  
 




Figure 44 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian 




Figure 45 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation (Civilians against Soldiers) 
 
Note that this scenario has a similar response as compared to the 
Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario. This suggests that there is no 
significant difference in the effect of leadership influences between disturber and 
trouble-maker groups in this homogeneous population scenario. 
c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The distributions of the civilian average fear, anger and RFA level 
at the end of the entire election simulation are illustrated in Figure 46, Figure 47 
and Figure 48A contour plot is shown in Figure 49 to illustrate the relationships 
between these three civilian personalities. Note that the maximum value for each 
factor is 100 units. 
 
Figure 46 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Fear 
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The average civilian fear and anger levels are high, with mean 
values of about 88 and 87 units. This result indicates that, on average, the 
civilians are fearful and angry. However, the average RFA level has a much 
lower mean value of about only 31 units. This suggests that on an average, the 
civilians may be angry and agitated at times but they are not likely to act 
aggressively. 
From the contour plot, it can be observed that the highest levels of 
civilian RFA occurred mostly when the civilian anger level is very high regardless 
of the civilian fear level. Note that this scenario has a similar response as 
compared to the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario where the 
Disturber’s leadership is modeled. This suggests that, on average, there is no 
significant difference between the Disturber’s and Trouble-maker’s leadership. 
 
Figure 47 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Anger 
 
 




Figure 49 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Fear, Anger 
and RFA Contour Plot 
 
2. Regression Tree Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of the 
regression tree shown in Figure 50. This partition yields an R2 value of 0.446, 
and indicates that the following design factor levels characterize those 
excursions where a high percentage of votes are observed: 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (<26) 
• Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation (>=75) 
• Civilian Personality Variance (<6) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear (<56) 
The effect of Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (>=26) and 
Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger (>=46) factors have contributed to 
causing a low percentage of votes cast. 
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Figure 50 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Vote Percentage Regression 
Tree 
 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The regression tree for accumulated civilian escalation yields an R2 
value of 0.774, as shown in Figure 51, indicates that the following design factor 
levels characterize those excursions where low aggregated civilian escalation is 
observed: 
• Control Soldier ROE (Set 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger (<48) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear (>=45) 
The effects of the following design factors have contributed in 
causing high civilian escalation: 
• Control Soldier ROE (Set 4 “Gandhi”) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (>=26) 




Figure 51 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation Regression Tree 
 
3. Model Fitting Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of this 
model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for analysis, the “best” 
model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting with the main 
effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 value of 0.50 
and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.2) were obtained. Refer to Figure 
52 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the regression tree were also 
included in the final model. A simple check of linearity and equal variance 
properties on the selected model indicated an absence of non-linearity and 
heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the average civilian 




Figure 52 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Vote Percentage Model Fit 
 
Percentage of Votes Cast = 10.65 – 0.21(Civ1R) – 0.03(Civ2A) – 
0.08(Civ3A) + 0.17(Civ3E) – 0.03(Civ4W) – 0.20(CivPV) – 0.18(PollROE) - 
0.06(PollROE+0.004)(Civ1R-20.01) + 0.05(PollROE+0.004)(Civ2A-20.01) + 
0.02(Civ3A-20.01)(Civ3E-80.01) 
Where: Civ1R = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA 
Civ2A = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter Anger 
Civ3A = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Anger 
Civ3E = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation 
Civ4W = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter WillCoop 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {2&3&6 – 1&4&5} 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped Poll Area Soldier’s ROE 
Set 2, 3 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the response 
that is different from Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 1, 4 and 5 (with value -1). 
From the metamodel, the Civ1R and Civ3E terms stand out 
statistically from the rest with higher t ratio values. This agrees with the 
regression tree results. Overall, the results indicate that when the level of RFA 
among Civ1 (Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voters) increase, the percentage of 
votes will decrease. This is not preferred, as we want the percentage of votes to 
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be high. Similarly, if the level of elective motivation among Civ3 (Sunni “No” 
Voters) increase, the percentage of votes will increase. This is desirable, as we 
want the percentage of votes to be high.  
Note that, with comparison to Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion 
scenario, this scenario has Civ4W term shown in the metamodel. This suggests 
that the effect of Trouble-Maker’s leadership is statistically more significant than 
Disturber’s leadership in contributing to the percentage of votes. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The civilian escalation accumulated during the entire simulation is 
the response of this model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for 
analysis, the “best” model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting 
with the main effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 
value of 0.80 and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.07) were obtained. 
Refer to Figure 53 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the 
regression tree were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity 
and equal variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of 
non-linearity and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the 
average civilian escalation is generated as follows: 
 
Figure 53 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian 





Aggregated Civilian Escalation = -27.64 – 2.92(Civ1F) + 
3.01(Civ1A) + 1.2(Civ1R) + 1.6(Civ2R) + 2.75(Civ4R) + 1.19(Civ4W) – 
1.85(Civ5F) + 2.08(Civ5R) – 130.87(CtrlROE) – 3.19(CtrlROE-0.6)(Civ1F-50.01) 
+ 4.01(CtrlROE-0.6)(Civ1A-50.01) – 4.5(CtrlROE-0.6)(Civ1R-20.01) 
Where: Civ1F = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear 
Civ1A = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ4R = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter RFA 
Civ4W = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter WillCoop 
Civ5F = Civ5 – Disturber Fear 
Civ5R = Civ5 – Disturber RFA 
CtrlROE = Control Soldier ROE {1&2&3&5&6 – 4} 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped Control Area Soldier’s 
ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 4 (with value -1).  
From the metamodel, the CtrlROE term stands out statistically from 
the rest with a very high t ratio value. Overall, the result indicates that when 
Control Area Admission Control Soldier employ ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, the 
level of aggregated civilian escalation will decrease, which is excellent as we 
want the civilian escalation to be minimized. Therefore, ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 
are excellent choices for Control Area in this election scenario. 
Note that, with comparison to Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion 
scenario, this scenario has Civ4W term shown in the metamodel. This again 
suggests that the effect of Trouble-Maker’s leadership is statistically more 
significant than Disturber’s leadership in contributing to the civilian escalation. 
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G. HOMO+TROUBLEMAKERLEAD+CTRLREGION+BOOTH RESULTS 
The results for the Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth follow. 
Recall that this is one of the scenarios where low voter turnout and high 
escalation are likely. 
1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
In this experiment, the deployments of Election Booths are 
implemented similar to the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario. 
Figure 54 shows the distribution of voter participation, in percent (i.e., the number 
of votes cast divided by the total number of registered voters) at the end of the 
election simulation. 
This scenario corresponds to a town with a homogeneous Sunni 
population that had one of the lowest voting turnout rates for the October 2005 
election. The simulation results show an average voter participation of about 
17.3% with a standard deviation of about 2.8%. This result suggests that the 
simulation results are fairly consistent with the real-world results. The distribution 
of the shortest half bracket (i.e., showing the densest 50% of the observations) 
indicated that the civilian voting participation varies over only a small range. 
Similar results can be observed from the quantile box plot, where the majority of 
the data is skewed towards the right. The fact that the distribution has a wide 
spread with highest percentage of vote at 20% and lowest at 7% shows that at 
least some factors may make a difference. 
 
Figure 54 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Voter Participation 
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Compared with the Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion scenario, 
the voter participation in this Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth 
scenario, where Election Booths are implemented, has shown improvement of 
about 1.9% on average with about the same standard deviation. Tighter voter 
participation distribution towards the high side is also observed in this scenario.  
Note that this Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth 
scenario results have similar good responses as the 
Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario where both scenarios have 
Election Booths deployed. Similar improvement results are achieved over the 
comparisons with their similar scenario where Election Booths are not deployed. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Figure 55 shows the distribution of the civilian escalation 
accumulated in the scenario over the entire election simulation. The distribution 
of civilian escalation demonstrated against other civilians is illustrated in Figure 
56. The distribution of civilian escalation demonstrated against the soldiers is 
illustrated in Figure 57. 
 
Figure 55 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation 
 
The aggregated civilian escalation that resulted in this scenario has 
a mean value at about 1212.3 units (i.e., threatening or attacking actions). The 
aggregated civilian escalation against other civilian has a mean value of about 
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398.8 units (about 33% of the total escalation). The mean aggregated civilian 
escalation against the soldier has a mean value of about 813.5 units (about 67% 
of the total escalation).  
 
 
Figure 56 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation (Civilians against other Civilians) 
 
 
Figure 57 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation  (Civilians against Soldiers) 
 
This result has a similar response as compared to the 
Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario, where huge increases in 
civilian escalation are observed. The majority of the time the escalation is 
between the civilians and soldiers. Similarly, this scenario has improvement in its 
voter participation, therefore supporting the same indication that the 
implementation of the Election Booths had managed to attract the hostile civilians 
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towards them and minimized the interactions among the civilians. This allows 
more motivated civilians to participate in the voting. Therefore, this situation is 
also considered controllable and is a desired election proceeding. 
c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The distributions of the civilian average fear, anger and RFA level 
at the end of the entire election simulation are illustrated in Figure 58, Figure 59 
and Figure 60. A contour plot is shown in Figure 61 to illustrate the relationships 
between these three civilian personalities. Note that the maximum value for each 
factor is 100 units. 
The average civilian fear and anger levels are high, with mean 
values of about 78 and 86 units. This result indicates that, on average, the 
civilians are fearful and angry. However, the average RFA level has a much 
lower mean value of about only 32 units. This suggests that on an average, the 
civilians may be angry and agitated at times but they are not likely to act 
aggressively. 
Note that the civilian fear level has dropped by 10 units as 
compared to the Homo+TroublemakerLead+CtrlRegion scenario where no 
Election Booths are deployed. This suggests that the Election Booths deployed in 
this scenario are gaining positive responses from the civilians. On an average, 
Civilians are now less fearful and are coming out from their homes to participate 
in the election. 
From the contour plot, it can be observed that the highest levels of 
civilian RFA occurred mostly when the civilian fear level was low and anger level 
was very high. It is also observed that when the civilian fear level was very high, 
the amount of civilian RFA was always low regardless of the civilian anger level. 
This suggests that on average, the civilian fear may be a significant factor 
contributing to the low civilian RFA. Note that this scenario has a similar 
response as compared to the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario  
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where the Disturber’s leadership is modeled. This suggests that, on average, 
there is no significant difference between the Disturber’s and Trouble-maker’s 
leadership. 
 
Figure 58 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Fear 
 
 
Figure 59 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Anger 
 
 
Figure 60 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian RFA 
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Figure 61 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Fear, 
Anger and RFA Contour Plot 
 
2. Regression Tree Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of the 
regression tree shown in Figure 62. This partition yields an R2 value of 0.463, 
and indicates that the following design factor levels characterize those 
excursions where a high percentage of votes are observed: 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (<28) 
• Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation (>=75) 
The effect of Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (>=28) and 
Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear (<46) factors have contributed in 
causing a low percentage of votes cast.  
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Figure 62 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Vote Percentage 
Regression Tree 
 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The regression tree for accumulated civilian escalation yields an R2 
value of 0.66, as shown in Figure 63, indicates that the following design factor 
levels characterize those excursions where low aggregated civilian escalation is 
observed: 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (<26) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger (>=56) 
The effect of the following design factors have contributed in 
causing high civilian escalation: 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA (>=26) 
• Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger (>=46) 




Figure 63 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation Regression Tree 
 
3. Model Fitting Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of this 
model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for analysis, the “best” 
model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting with the main 
effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 value of 0.71 
and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.2) were obtained. Refer to Figure 
64 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the regression tree were also 
included in the final model. A simple check of linearity on the selected model 
indicated an absence of any non-linearity problems. The metamodel for 
predicting the average civilian escalation is generated as follows: 
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Figure 64 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Vote Percentage 
Model Fit 
 
Percentage of Votes Cast = 15.94 + 0.13(Civ1F) – 0.13(Civ1A) – 
0.18(Civ1R) – 0.05(Civ2A) – 0.09(Civ3A) – 0.03(Civ3R) + 0.17(Civ3E) – 
0.03(Civ4W) – 0.04(Civ5A) – 0.2(CivPV) – 0.15(CtrlROE) + 0.02(Civ1F-
50.01)(Civ1R-20.01) – 0.01(Civ1F-50.01)(Civ3E-80.01) – 0.01(Civ1A-
50.01)(Civ1R-20.01) + 0.01(Civ1A-50.01)(Civ3E-80.01) + 0.01(Civ3A-
20.01)(Civ3E-80.01) – 0.01(Civ1A-50.01)(Civ3A-20.01) 
Where: Civ1F = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear 
Civ1A = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA 
Civ2A = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter Anger 
Civ3A = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Anger 
Civ3R = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter RFA 
Civ3E = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation 
Civ4W = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter WillCoop 
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Civ5A = Civ5 – Disturber Anger 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
CtrlROE = Control Soldier ROE {1&2&4&6 – 3} 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped Control Area Soldier’s 
ROE Set 1, 2, 4 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 3 (with value -1). 
From the metamodel, the Civ1R and Civ3E terms stand out 
statistically from the rest with higher t ratio values.  Overall, the results indicate 
that when the level of RFA among Civ1 (Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voters) 
increase, the percentage of votes will decrease. This is not preferred, as we want 
the percentage of votes to be high. On the contrary, if the level of elective 
motivation among Civ3 (Sunni “No” Voters) increase, the percentage of votes will 
increase. This is desirable, as we want the percentage of votes to be high.  
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The civilian escalation accumulated during the entire simulation is 
the response of this model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for 
analysis, the “best” model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting 
with the main effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 
value of 0.6 and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.02) were obtained. 
Refer to Figure 65 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the 
regression tree were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity 
and equal variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of 
non-linearity and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the 
average civilian escalation is generated as follows: 
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Figure 65 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation Model Fit 
 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation = -1952.21 + 12.89(Civ1F) – 
10.88(Civ1A) + 38.83(Civ1R) + 8.38(Civ4A) + 10.29(Civ4R) + 11.1(Civ5R) + 
30.64(CivPV) – 43.71(PollROE1) – 61.45(PollROE2) – 3.58(Civ1F-50.01)(Civ1R-
20.01) + 3.35(Civ1A-50.01)(Civ1R-20.01) 
Where: Civ1F = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Fear 
Civ1A = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Sunni Bystander/Fearful Voter RFA 
Civ4A = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter Anger 
Civ4R = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter RFA 
Civ5R = Civ5 – Disturber RFA 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE1 = Poll Soldier ROE {1&4&5&6 –2&3} 
PollROE2 = Poll Soldier ROE {1&4&5&6} 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped Poll Area Soldier’s ROE 
Set 1, 4, 5 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 2 and 3 (with value -
1).  
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From the metamodel, the Civ1R term stands out statistically from 
the rest with a very high t ratio value.  Overall, the result indicates that when the 
level of RFA among Civ1 (Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voters) increase, the 
level of aggregated civilian escalation will increase. This is not preferred, as we 
want the escalation to be low.  
 
H. HETER+DISTURBERLEAD+CTRLREGION RESULTS 
The results for the Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion follow. Recall that this 
is one of the scenarios where high voter turnout and high escalation are likely. 
1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
In this mixed population scenario, a high voting turnout rate is 
expected. However, the increase in the civilian participation from different groups 
may result in a surge of civilian conflicts during the election proceeding. This 
surge could affect the voter participation rate. Figure 66 shows the distribution of 
voter participation, in percent (i.e., the number of votes cast divided by the total 
number of registered voters) at the end of the election simulation. 
This scenario corresponds to a town with a heterogeneous Sunni 
and Shiite/Kurd population that had one of the highest voting turnout rates for the 
October 2005 election. The simulation results show an average voter 
participation of about 28.3% with a standard deviation of about 6.2%. This result 
has certainly showed a better voter participation rate over those results achieved 
in the homogeneous Sunni population scenarios. The distribution of the shortest 
half bracket (i.e., showing the densest 50% of the observations) indicates that the 
civilian voting participation varies over a large range. This result is much lower 
than expected in the hypothetical scenario. This could due to the fact that 
different ROE rule sets, human behaviors, etc., are modeled in the simulations. 
However, the fact that the distribution has a wide spread with highest percentage 




Figure 66 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Voter Participation 
 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Figure 67 shows the distribution of the civilian escalation 
accumulated in the scenario over the entire election simulation. The distribution 
of civilian escalation demonstrated against other civilians is illustrated in 0. The 
distribution of civilian escalation demonstrated against the soldiers is illustrated in 
Figure 69.  
The aggregated civilian escalation results in this scenario have a 
mean value of about 251.6 units (i.e., threatening or attacking actions). The 
aggregated civilian escalation against other civilians has a mean value of about 
197 units (about 78% of the total escalation). The mean aggregated civilian 
escalation against the soldier has a mean value of about 54.7 units (about 22% 
of the total escalation). This result indicates that the majority of the escalation is 
among the civilians. This is a undesirable situation during an election. However, it 





Figure 67 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
 
 
Figure 68 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
(Civilians against other Civilians) 
 
 
Figure 69 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 




c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The distributions of the civilian average fear, anger and RFA level 
at the end of the entire election simulation are illustrated in Figure 70, Figure 71 
and Figure 72. A contour plot is shown in Figure 73 to illustrate the relationships 
between these three civilian personalities. Note that the maximum value for each 
factor is 100 units. 
The average civilian fear and anger levels are high, with mean 
values of about 88 and 81 units. This result indicates that, on average, the 
civilians are fearful and angry. However, the average RFA level has a much 
lower mean value of about only 27 units. This suggests that on an average, the 
civilians may be angry and agitated at times but they are not likely to act 
aggressively. 
From the contour plot, it can be observed that the highest levels of 
civilian RFA occur mostly when the civilian fear and anger levels are both very 
high. Note that this scenario has a similar civilian fear and anger response as 
compared to the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario where the 
homogeneous population is modeled. On average, it has a slight decrease in 
civilian RFA of about five units. 
 




Figure 71 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Anger 
 
 
Figure 72 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian RFA 
 
 
Figure 73 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Fear, Anger and 
RFA Contour Plot 
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2. Regression Tree Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of the 
regression tree shown in Figure 74. This partition yields an R2 value of 0.468 as 
shown in has indicates that the effect of the Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voters Elective 
Motivation (>=83) factor has solely contributed to the high voter participation in 
those excursions where a high percentage of votes are observed. 
The effect of the following design factor levels characterize those 
excursions where a low percentage of votes are observed: 
• Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation (<83) 
• Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation (<78) 
• Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA (>=26) 
 
Figure 74 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Vote Percentage Regression Tree 
 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The regression tree for accumulated civilian escalation yields an R2 
value of 0.48, as shown in Figure 75, indicates that the effect of Control Soldier 
ROE (Set 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6) design factor has solely contributed to the low civilian 
escalation in those excursions where low aggregated civilian escalation are 
observed. 
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The effect of the following design factors have contributed in 
causing high civilian escalation: 
• Control Soldier ROE (Set 4 “Gandhi”) 
• Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA (>=28) 
• Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation (>=80) 
 
Figure 75 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Regression Tree 
 
3. Model Fitting Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of this 
model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for analysis, the “best” 
model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting with the main 
effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 value of 0.66 
and low p-values for all terms (i.e. highest at 0.004) were obtained. Refer to 
Figure 76 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the regression tree 
were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity and equal 
variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of non-linearity 
and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the average civilian 
escalation is generated as follows: 
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Percentage of Votes Cast = -10.07 – 0.29(Civ1A) – 0.24(Civ1R) + 
0.67(Civ1E) – 0.15(Civ2R) – 0.11(Civ2E) + 0.12(Civ3E) – 0.47(CivPV) – 
0.02(Civ1R-20.01)(Civ3E-80.01) + 0.02(Civ2E-80.01)(Civ3E-80.01) 
Where: Civ1A = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA 
Civ1E = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter EMotivation 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ2E = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter EMotivation 
Civ3E = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter EMotivation 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
 
Figure 76 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Vote Percentage Model Fit 
 
From the metamodel, the Civ1E term stands out statistically from 
the rest with a higher t ratio value.  Overall, the result indicates that if the level of 
elective motivation among Civ1 (Shiite/Kurd Voter) increases, the percentage of 
votes will increase. This is preferred, as we want the percentage of votes to be 
high. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The number of civilian escalation accumulated during the entire 
simulation is the response of this model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a 
simple model for analysis, the “best” model was finally selected after a few cycles 
of manual fitting with the main effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. 
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A satisfactory R2 value of 0.59 and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 
0.01) were obtained. Refer to Figure 77 for details. Note that those factors 
highlighted by the regression tree were also included in the final model. A simple 
check of linearity and equal variance properties on the selected model indicated 
an absence of non-linearity and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for 
predicting the average civilian escalation is generated as follows: 
 
Figure 77 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Model Fit 
 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation = -261.4 + 4.35(Civ1R) + 
3.21(Civ2R) + 1.74(Civ3R) + 3.12(Civ4R) + 2.32(Civ5R) + 6.14(CivPV) – 
17.62(PollROE) – 67.21(CtrlROE) – 1.86(PollROE-0.2)(Civ1R-20.01) – 
3.01(CtrlROE-0.6)(Civ1R-20.01) – 3.88(CtrlROE-0.6)(Civ2R-20.01) – 
2.6(CtrlROE-0.6)(Civ3R-20.01) 
Where: Civ1R = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ3R = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter RFA 
Civ4R = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter RFA 
Civ5R = Civ5 – Disturber RFA 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {1&2&5&6 – 3&4} 
CtrlROE = Control Soldier ROE {1&2&3&5&6 – 4} 
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Note that JMP has automatically grouped the Poll Area Soldier’s 
ROE Set 1, 2, 5 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 3 and 4 (with value -
1). Similarly, it has grouped Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 
together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the response that is different 
from Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 4 (with value -1). 
From the metamodel, the CtrlROE term stands out statistically from 
the rest with a very high t ratio value.  Overall, the result indicates that when the 
Control Area Admission Control Soldier employ ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, the 
level of aggregated civilian escalation will decrease, which is excellent as we 
want the civilian escalation to be minimized. Therefore, ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 
are excellent choices for the Control Area in this election scenario. 
Note that the “main effect” terms are mainly RFA factors from all 
civilian groups and they all have positive coefficient values. This suggests that if 
the level of civilian RFA is high in all the civilian groups, then the level of civilian 
escalation in this given heterogeneous population scenario will be increased. 
Therefore, this situation must be avoided. 
 
I. HETER+DISTURBERLEAD+CTRLREGION+BOOTH RESULTS 
The results for the Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth follow. Recall 
that this is one of the scenarios where high voter turnout and high escalation are 
likely. 
1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
In this experiment, the deployments of Election Booths are 
implemented. Figure 78 shows the distribution of voter participation, in percent 
(i.e., the number of votes cast divided by the total number of registered voters) at 
the end of the election simulation. 
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Figure 78 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Voter Participation 
 
This scenario corresponds to a town with a heterogeneous Sunni 
and Shiite/Kurd population that had one of the highest voting turnout rates for the 
October 2005 election. The simulation results show an average voter 
participation of about 28.8% with a standard deviation of about 7.3%. The 
distribution of the shortest half bracket (i.e., showing the densest 50% of the 
observations) indicates that the civilian voting participation varies over a large 
range. The fact that the distribution has a wide spread with highest percentage of 
vote at 50.9% and lowest at 14% shows that at least some factors may make a 
difference. 
Comparing with the Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario, the 
voting participation in this Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario 
where Election Booths are implemented, does not show any sizable 
improvement. Very similar voting participation distributions are observed in both 
scenarios. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Figure 79 shows the distribution of the civilian escalation 
accumulated in the scenario over the entire election simulation. The distribution 
of civilian escalation demonstrated against other civilians is illustrated in Figure 
80. The distribution of civilian escalation demonstrated against the soldiers is 
illustrated in Figure 81. 
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The aggregated civilian escalation resulted in this scenario has a 
mean value at about 1047.6 units (i.e., threatening or attacking actions). The 
aggregated civilian escalation against other civilian has a mean value of about 
282.8 units (about 27% of the total escalation). The mean aggregated civilian 
escalation against soldiers has a mean value of about 764.8 units (about 73% of 
the total escalation). This result indicates a huge increase in civilian escalation 
occurs in this scenario (where Election Booths are deployed).  
 
Figure 79 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation 
 
This result also indicates that the majority of the escalation is 
between the civilians and soldiers, which is completely the opposite as compared 
to the Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario where no Election Booths are 
deployed. Since there is no sizeable improvement in the voter participation the 
increase in civilian escalation suggests that the deployment of Election Booth is 




Figure 80 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation (Civilians against other Civilians) 
 
 
Figure 81 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation (Civilians against Soldiers) 
 
c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The distributions of the civilian average fear, anger and RFA level 
at the end of the entire election simulation are illustrated in Figure 83 and Figure 
84. A contour plot is shown in Figure 85 to illustrate the relationships between 
these three civilian personalities. Note that the maximum value for each factor is 
100 units.  
The average civilian fear and anger levels are high, with mean 
values of about 78 and 83 units. This result indicates that, on average, the 
civilians are fearful and angry. However, the average RFA level has a much 
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lower mean value of about only 28 units. This suggests that on an average, the 




Figure 82 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Fear 
 
 
Figure 83 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Anger 
 
Note that the civilian fear level has dropped by 10 units as 
compared to the Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario where no Election 
Booths are deployed. This suggests that the Election Booths deployed in this 
scenario are gaining positive responses from the civilians. On average, Civilians 





Figure 84 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian RFA 
 
 
Figure 85 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Fear, 
Anger and RFA Contour Plot 
 
From the contour plot, it can be observed that the highest levels of 
civilian RFA occur mostly when the civilian fear and anger levels are both very 
high. These high RFA observations are isolated to the top right hand corner of 
the contour plot, suggesting that the majority of the time, the election proceeding 
is peaceful with low civilian escalation. This also suggest that, on average, the 
Election Booths might have contributed to the results whereas the hostilities are 





2. Regression Tree Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of the 
regression tree shown in Figure 86. This partition yields an R2 value of 0.526, 
and indicates that the effect of Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation 
(>=84) design factor has solely contributed to the high voter participation in those 
excursions where a high percentage of votes are observed. 
The effect of Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation (<84) and 
Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation (<76) design factors have 
contributed in causing a low percentage of votes cast.  
 
Figure 86 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Vote Percentage 
Regression Tree 
 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The regression tree for accumulated civilian escalation yields an R2 
value of 0.209 as shown in Figure 87, indicates that the following design factor 
levels characterize those excursions where low aggregated civilian escalation is 
observed: 
• Civ5 – Disturber RFA (<84) 
• Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation (<85) 
123
The effect of Civ5 – Disturber RFA (>=84) and Civilian Personality 
Variance (>=4) factors have contributed in causing a high civilian escalation.  
 
Figure 87 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation Regression Tree 
 
3. Model Fitting Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of this 
model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for analysis, the “best” 
model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting with the main 
effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 value of 0.62 
and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.006) were obtained. Refer to 
Figure 88 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the regression tree 
were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity and equal 
variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of non-linearity 
and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the average civilian 
escalation is generated as follows: 
Percentage of Votes Cast = 1.64 – 0.33(Civ1A) – 0.22(Civ1R) + 
0.81(Civ1E) – 0.14(Civ2A) – 0.19(Civ2R) – 0.22(Civ3E) – 0.47(CivPV) 
Where: Civ1A = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA 
Civ1E = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter EMotivation 
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Civ2A = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter Anger 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ3E = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter EMotivation 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
 
Figure 88 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Vote Percentage Model Fit 
 
From the metamodel, the Civ1E term stands out statistically from 
the rest with a higher t ratio value.  Overall, the result indicates that if the level of 
elective motivation among Civ1 (Shiite/Kurd Voter) increase, the percentage of 
votes will increase. This is preferred, as we want the percentage of votes to be 
high. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The civilian escalation accumulated during the entire simulation is 
the response of this model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for 
analysis, the “best” model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting 
with the main effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 
value of 0.50 and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.03) were obtained. 
Refer to Figure 89 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the 
regression tree were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity 
and equal variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of 
non-linearity and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the 
average civilian escalation is generated as follows: 
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Aggregated Civilian Escalation = 242.83 + 8.95(Civ1R) – 
10.13(Civ1E) + 7.76(Civ2R) + 4.28(Civ2E) + 9.52(Civ3E) – 10.78(Civ5A) + 
11.83(Civ5R) + 24.7(CivPV) – 36.84(PollROE) – 62.29(CtrlROE) – 6.18(CtrlROE-
0.6)(Civ1R-20.01) 
Where: Civ1R = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA 
Civ1E = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter EMotivation 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ2E = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter EMotivation 
Civ3E = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter EMotivation 
Civ5A = Civ4 – Disturber Anger 
Civ5R = Civ5 – Disturber RFA 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {1&5&6 – 2&3&4} 
CtrlROE = Control Soldier ROE {1&2&3&5&6 –4} 
 
Figure 89 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation Model Fit 
 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped the Poll Area Soldier’s 
ROE Set 1, 5 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 2, 3 and 4 (with value 
-1). Similarly, it has grouped Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 
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together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the response that is different 
from Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 4 (with value -1). 
From the metamodel, the majority of the main effect terms except 
Civ2E and PollROE terms, are statistically significant in the presence of the rest 
with all having fairly close t ratio values.  For example, the overall result indicates 
that when the Control Area Admission Control Soldier employs ROE Sets 1, 2, 3, 
5 and 6, the level of aggregated civilian escalation will decrease. This is 
excellent, as we want the civilian escalation to be minimized. Therefore, ROE 
Sets 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 are excellent choices for the Control Area in this election 
scenario. In another example, the overall result indicates that if the personalities 
among the civilians vary over a large range, the level of aggregated civilian 
escalation will increase. This is also not preferred, as we want the civilian 
escalation to be minimized. 
 
J. HETER+TROUBLEMAKERLEAD+CTRLREGION RESULTS 
The results for the Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion follow. Recall 
that this is one of the scenarios where high voter turnout and high escalation are 
likely. 
1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
Figure 90 shows the distribution of voter participation, in percent 
(i.e., the number of votes cast divided by the total number of registered voters) at 
the end of the election simulation. 
 
Figure 90 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Voter Participation 
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This scenario corresponds to a town with a heterogeneous Sunni 
and Shiite/Kurd population that had one of the highest voting turnout rates for the 
October 2005 election. The simulation results show an average voter 
participation of about 28.2% with a standard deviation of about 6.0%. The 
distribution of the shortest half bracket (i.e., showing the densest 50% of the 
observations) indicates that the civilian voting participation varies over a large 
range. Since the distribution has a wide spread with highest percentage of vote 
at 40.8% and lowest at 13.5%, some factors may make a difference. Compared 
with the Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion and the 
Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenarios, the voter participation in this 
Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion scenario has shown almost similar results. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Figure 91 shows the distribution of the civilian escalation 
accumulated in the scenario over the entire election simulation. The distribution 
of civilian escalation demonstrated against other civilians is illustrated in Figure 
92. The distribution of civilian escalation demonstrated against the soldiers is 
illustrated in Figure 93. The aggregated civilian escalation results in this scenario 
have a mean value of about 250.5 units (i.e., threatening or attacking actions). 
The aggregated civilian escalation against other civilians has a mean value of 
about 196 units (about 78% of the total escalation). The mean aggregated civilian 
escalation against the soldier has a mean value of about 54.6 units (about 22% 
of the total escalation). This result indicates that the majority of the escalation is 
among the civilians. This is an undesirable situation during an election.  
 
Figure 91 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
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Figure 92 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
(Civilians against other Civilians) 
 
Note that this scenario has a similar response as compared to the 
Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario. This suggests that there is no 
significant different in the effect of the leadership’s influences between disturber 
and trouble-maker groups in this heterogeneous population scenario. 
 
Figure 93 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
(Civilians against Soldiers) 
 
c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The distributions of the civilian average fear, anger and RFA level 
at the end of  the entire election simulation are illustrated in Figure 94, Figure 95 
and Figure 96. A contour plot is shown in Figure 97 to illustrate the relationships 
between these three civilian personalities. Note that the maximum value for each 
factor is 100 units. 
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Figure 94 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Fear 
 
Figure 95 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Anger 
 
The average civilian fear and anger levels are high, with mean 
values of about 88 and 81 units. This result indicates that, on average, the 
civilians are fearful and angry. However, the average RFA level has a much 
lower mean value of about only 27 units. This suggests that on an average, the 
civilians may be angry and agitated at times but they are not likely to act 
aggressively. 
From the contour plot, it can be observed that the highest levels of 
civilian RFA occur mostly when the civilian anger level is very high regardless of 
the civilian fear level. Note that this scenario has a similar response as compared 
to the Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario where the Disturber’s 
leadership is modeled. This suggests that, on average, there is no significant 
difference between the Disturber’s and Trouble-Maker’s leadership. 
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Figure 96 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian RFA 
 
 
Figure 97 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Average Civilian Fear, Anger 
and RFA Contour Plot 
 
2. Regression Tree Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of the 
regression tree shown in Figure 98. This partition yields an R2 value of 0.509, 
and indicates that the effect of Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation 
(>=83) design factor has solely contributed to the high voter participation in those 
excursions where a high percentage of votes are observed. The effect of the 
following design factor levels characterize those excursions where a low 
percentage of votes are observed: 
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• Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation (<83) 
• Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation (<78) 
• Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA (>=26) 
 
Figure 98 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Vote Percentage Regression 
Tree 
 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The regression tree for accumulated civilian escalation yields an R2 
value of 0.475, as shown in Figure 99, indicates that the effect of Control Soldier 
ROE (Set 1, 2, 3, 5 & 6) factor has solely contributed to the low civilian escalation 
in those excursions where low aggregated civilian escalation are observed. 
The effect of the following design factor levels characterize those 
excursions where high aggregated civilian escalation is observed: 
• Control Soldier ROE (Set 4 “Gandhi”) 
• Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA (>=28) 
• Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation (>=80) 
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Figure 99 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Regression Tree 
 
3. Model Fitting Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of this 
model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for analysis, the “best” 
model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting with the main 
effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 value of 0.66 
and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.03) were obtained. Refer to 
Figure 100 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the regression tree 
were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity and equal 
variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of non-linearity 
and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the average civilian 
escalation is generated as follows: 
 
Figure 100 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Vote Percentage Model Fit 
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Percentage of Votes Cast = -8.34 – 0.29(Civ1A) – 0.22(Civ1R) + 
0.66(Civ1E) – 0.17(Civ2R) – 0.13(Civ2E) + 0.12(Civ3E) – 0.49(CivPV) – 
0.62(PollROE) – 0.02(Civ1R-20.01)(Civ3E-80.01) 
Where: Civ1A = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA 
Civ1E = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter EMotivation 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ2E = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter EMotivation 
Civ3E = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter EMotivation 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {1&6 – 2&3&5} 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped the Poll Area Soldier’s 
ROE Set 1 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 2, 3 and 5 (with value 
-1). 
From the metamodel, the Civ1E term stands out statistically from 
the rest with a higher t ratio value.  Overall, the result indicates that if the level of 
elective motivation among the Civ1 (Shiite/Kurd Voter) increase, the percentage 
of votes will increase, which is excellent as we want the percentage of votes to 
be high.  
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The civilian escalation accumulated during the entire simulation is 
the response of this model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for 
analysis, the “best” model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting 
with the main effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 
value of 0.69 and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.0003) were 
obtained. Refer to Figure 101 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by 
the regression tree were also included in the final model. A simple check of 
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linearity and equal variance properties on the selected model indicated an 
absence of non-linearity and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for 
predicting the average civilian escalation is generated as follows: 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation = 112.33 + 4.93(Civ1R) – 
2.16(Civ1E) + 2.84(Civ2R) + 2.34(Civ3R) + 2.84(Civ4R) + 5.92(CivPV) – 
33.34(PollROE) – 66.65(CtrlROE) + 22.14(PollROE-0.6)(CtrlROE-0.6) – 
2.98(PollROE-0.6)(Civ1R-20.01) – 3.63(CtrlROE-0.6)(Civ1R-20.01) – 
3.12(CtrlROE-0.6)(Civ2R-20.01) – 3.25(CtrlROE-0.6)(Civ3R-20.01) 
Where: Civ1R = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA 
Civ1E = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter EMotivation 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ3R = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter RFA 
Civ4R = Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter RFA 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {1&2&3&5&6 – 4} 
CtrlROE = Control Soldier ROE {1&2&3&5&6 – 4} 
 
 




Note that JMP has automatically grouped the Poll Area Soldier’s 
ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from the Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 4 (with value -1). 
Similarly, it has grouped the Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 
together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the response that is different 
from the Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 4 (with value -1). 
From the metamodel, the Civ1R, PollROE and CtrlROE terms 
stand out statistically from the rest with higher t ratio values. For example, the 
overall results indicate that when the Control Area Admission Control Soldier 
employ ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, the level of aggregated civilian escalation will 
decrease. This is excellent, as we want the civilian escalation to be minimized. 
Therefore, ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 are excellent choices for Control Area in this 
election scenario. Similarly, ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 are excellent choices for 
Poll Area in this election scenario. In another example, the overall result indicates 
that if the level of RFA among Civ1 (Shiite/Kurd Voter) increase, the level of 
aggregated civilian escalation will increase. This is undesirable, as we want the 
civilian escalation to be minimized.  
 
K. HETER+TROUBLEMAKERLEAD+CTRLREGION+BOOTH RESULTS 
The results for the Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth follow. 
Recall that this is one of the scenarios where high voter turnout and high 
escalation are likely. 
1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
In this experiment, the deployments of Election Booths are 
implemented similar to the Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario.  
Figure 102 shows the distribution of voter participation, in percent (i.e., the 
number of votes cast divided by the total number of registered voters) at the end 
of the election simulation. 
136
This scenario corresponds to a town with a heterogeneous Sunni 
and Shiite/Kurd population that had one of the highest voting turnout rates for the 
October 2005 election. The simulation results show an average voter 
participation of about 28.6% with a standard deviation of about 7.2%. The 
distribution of the shortest half bracket (i.e., showing the densest 50% of the 
observations) indicates that the civilian voting participation varies over a large 
range. The fact that the distribution has a wide spread with highest percentage of 




Figure 102 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Voter Participation 
 
Compared with the Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion, 
Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth and the 
Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion scenarios, the voter participation in this 
Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario has shown almost similar 
results.  
With this comparison, the results suggest that the deployments of 
Election Booths in the heterogeneous population scenarios are not contributing 
much improvement to the average voter participation rate. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Figure 103 shows the distribution of the civilian escalation 
accumulated in the scenario over the entire election simulation. The distribution 
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of civilian escalation demonstrated against other civilians is illustrated in Figure 
104. The distribution of civilian escalation demonstrated against the soldiers is 
illustrated in Figure 105. 
 
 




Figure 104 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation (Civilians against other Civilians) 
 
The aggregated civilian escalation resulted in this scenario has a 
mean value of about 1024.2 units (i.e., threatening or attacking actions). The 
aggregated civilian escalation against other civilians has a mean value of about 
280.1 units (about 27% of the total escalation). The mean aggregated civilian 
escalation against the soldier has a mean value of about 744 units (about 73% of 
the total escalation).  
This result has a similar response as compared to the 
Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario. There was a huge increase in 
civilian escalation and the majority of the time the escalation is between the 
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civilians and soldiers. Similarly, this scenario does not yield much improvement in 
its voter participation, therefore supporting the same indication that the 
implementation of the Election Booths is redundant in this heterogeneous 
population scenario and is not a desired election proceeding. 
 
Figure 105 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation (Civilians against Soldiers) 
 
c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The distributions of the civilian average fear, anger and RFA level 
at the end of the entire election simulation are illustrated in Figure 106, Figure 
107 and Figure 108. A contour plot is shown in Figure 109 to illustrate the 
relationships between these three civilian personalities. Note that the maximum 
value for each factor is 100 units. 
The average civilian fear and anger levels are high, with mean 
values of about 78 and 83 units. This result indicates that, on average, the 
civilians are fearful and angry. However, the average RFA level has a much 
lower mean value of about only 29 units. This suggests that on an average, the 
civilians may be angry and agitated at times but they are not likely to act 
aggressively. 
Note that civilian fear level has dropped by 10 units as compared to 
the Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion scenario where no Election Booths are 
deployed. This suggests that the Election Booths deployed in this scenario are 
gaining positive responses from the civilians. On an average, civilians are now 
less fearful and are coming out from their homes to participate in the election. 
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Figure 106 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Average Civilian Fear 
 
 
Figure 107 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Anger 
 
From the contour plot, it can be observed that the highest levels of 
civilian RFA occur mostly when the civilian fear and anger levels are both very 
high. These high RFA observations are isolated to the top right hand corner of 
the contour plot, suggesting that the majority of the time, the election proceeding 
is peaceful with low civilian escalation. This also suggest that, on average, the 
Election Booths might have contributed to the results where hostilities are now 
isolated during the election proceeding. 
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Figure 109 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Fear, Anger and RFA Contour Plot 
 
Note that this scenario has a similar response as compared to the 
Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario where the Disturber’s 
leadership is modeled. This suggests that, on average, there is no significant 
difference between the Disturber’s and Trouble-maker’s leadership. 
However, with comparison to the homogeneous population 
scenario, where similar Election Booths are deployed, it is observed that on 
average, in this heterogeneous population scenario (with Election Booths), the 
majority of the high RFA occurred when the civilian fear is high. On the contrary, 
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on average, in this homogeneous population scenario (with Election Booths), the 
majority of the high RFA occurred when the civilian fear is low. 
2. Regression Tree Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of the 
regression tree shown in Figure 110. This partition yields an R2 value of 0.526, 
and indicates that the effect of Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation 
(>=84) factor has solely contributed to the high voter participation in those 
excursions where a high percentage of votes are observed. 
 
Figure 110 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Vote Percentage 
Regression Tree 
 
The effect of Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation (<84) and 
Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation (<77) factors have contributed in 
causing a low percentage of votes cast.  
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The regression tree for accumulated civilian escalation yields an R2 
value of 0.262, as shown in Figure 111, and indicates that the following design 
factor levels characterize those excursions where low aggregated civilian 
escalation is observed: 
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• Civilian Personality Variance (<5) 
• Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA (<28) 
The effect of Civilian Personality Variance (>=5) factor has solely 
contributed in causing high civilian escalation.  
 
Figure 111 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation Regression Tree 
 
3. Model Fitting Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The percentage of votes cast by the civilians is the response of this 
model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for analysis, the “best” 
model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting with the main 
effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 value of 0.65 
and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.008) were obtained. Refer to 
Figure 112 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the regression tree 
were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity and equal 
variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of non-linearity 
and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the average civilian 
escalation is generated as follows: 
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Figure 112 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Vote Percentage Model 
Fit 
 
Percentage of Votes Cast = 5.37 – 0.34(Civ1A) – 0.21(Civ1R) + 
0.79(Civ1E) – 0.15(Civ2A) – 0.19(Civ2R) – 0.13(Civ3R) – 0.21(Civ3E) – 
0.5(CivPV) – 0.03(Civ1E-80.01)(Civ3R-20.01) 
Where: Civ1A = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Anger 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA 
Civ1E = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter EMotivation 
Civ2A = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter Anger 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ3R = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter RFA 
Civ3E = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter EMotivation 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
From the metamodel, the Civ1E term stands out statistically from 
the rest with a higher t ratio value.  Overall, the result indicates that if the level of 
elective motivation among the Civ1 (Shiite/Kurd Voter) increases, the percentage 
of votes will increase. This is excellent, as we want the percentage of votes to be 
high.  
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The civilian escalation accumulated during the entire simulation is 
the response of this model fitting analysis. In order to achieve a simple model for 
analysis, the “best” model was finally selected after a few cycles of manual fitting 
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with the main effects, two-way interactions and quadratic terms. A satisfactory R2 
value of 0.53 and low p-values for all terms (i.e., highest at 0.05) were obtained. 
Refer to Figure 113 for details. Note that those factors highlighted by the 
regression tree were also included in the final model. A simple check of linearity 
and equal variance properties on the selected model indicated an absence of 
non-linearity and heteroskedacity problems. The metamodel for predicting the 
average civilian escalation is generated as follows: 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation = 164.1 – 28.92(PollROE) – 
50.15(CtrlROE) + 4.61(Civ1F) + 8.59(Civ1R) – 13.8(Civ1E) + 8.73(Civ2R) + 
5.36(Civ2E) + 3.85(Civ3F) – 5.17(Civ5F) + 12.25(Civ5R) + 33.58(CivPV) – 
0.98(Civ2R-20.01)(Civ2E-80.01) + 1.08(Civ3F-20.01)(Civ5F-20.01) 
Where: Civ1F = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter Fear 
Civ1R = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA 
Civ1E = Civ1 – Shiite/Kurd Voter EMotivation 
Civ2R = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
Civ2E = Civ2 – Sunni “Yes” Voter EMotivation 
Civ3F = Civ3 – Sunni “No” Voter Fear 
Civ5F = Civ5 – Disturber Fear 
Civ5R = Civ5 – Disturber RFA 
CivPV = Civilian Personality Variance 
PollROE = Poll Soldier ROE {1&2&5&6 –3&4} 
CtrlROE = Control Soldier ROE {1&2&3&5 – 4&6} 
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Figure 113 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation Model Fit 
 
Note that JMP has automatically grouped the Poll Area Soldier’s 
ROE Set 1, 2, 5 and 6 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the 
response that is different from the Poll Area Soldier’s ROE Set 3 and 4 (with 
value -1). Similarly, it has grouped the Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 1, 2, 3 
and 5 together (with value 1) as having the same effect on the response that is 
different from the Control Area Soldier’s ROE Set 4 and 6 (with value -1). 
From the metamodel, the Civ1E, Civ5R and CivPV terms stand out 
statistically from the rest with higher t ratio values.  Overall, the results indicate 
that if the personalities among the civilians vary over a large range, the level of 
aggregated civilian escalation will increase. This is undesirable, as we want the 
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V. RESULTS SUMMARY AND COMPARISON ANALYSIS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter summarizes the results presented in Chapter IV and provides 
detailed comparisons between the homogeneous and heterogeneous population 
scenarios. It will attempt to identify significant factors and draw conclusions on 
the proposed military tactics, techniques and procedures that are modeled and 
studied in this research. 
 
B. HOMOGENEOUS SUNNI POPULATION SCENARIO 
1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The summary of the voter participation results for all homogeneous 
Sunni population scenarios generated in Chapter IV are tabulated in Table 8. 
Refer to Figure 114 for a chart comparison on the mean percentage voter 
participation results between the scenarios. 
 
Number of Votes (Percentage) - Homogeneous Sunni Population Scenario
S/No Scenario Lowest Mean Median Highest Dense
1 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion 8.8 15.5 15.7 20.0 No
2 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 9.2 17.7 18.7 20.1 Yes
3 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion 8.3 15.4 15.6 19.9 No
4 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 7.0 17.3 18.3 20.1 Yes  
Table 8 Summary of Voter Participation (%) in Homogeneous Sunni Population 
Hybrid Scenarios 
 
Generally, the average voter participation has improved (p-value < 
0.05) in those scenarios where Election Booths are deployed. The simulation 
results in each of those scenarios have a narrower half-bracket (i.e., the densest 
50% of the observations) distribution near the upper end of the distribution, 
indicating that although voter participation is still low, very unfavorable results are 
less likely to occur when Election Booths are present. This can also be observed 
from their higher median values (indicating where half of the observations fall on 
higher voter participation regions). Therefore, from the average vote percentage 
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results, this research reveals that the deployment of Election Booths has 
generally contributed improvement to the average voter participation in 
homogeneous Sunni population scenario. Note that there is also a marginal but 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.055) improvement in the voter participation in 
those scenarios with Disturber’s leadership influence. 
 
Homogeneous Sunni Population 
Voting Participation (Mean %)












Figure 114 Summary of Voter Participation (Mean %) in Homogeneous Sunni 
Population Hybrid Scenarios 
 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The summary of the average aggregated civilian escalation results 
for all homogeneous Sunni population scenarios generated in Chapter IV are 
tabulated in Table 9. Refer to Figure 115 for a chart comparison on the mean 
aggregated civilian escalation results between the scenarios. Civilian escalations 
against other Civilians or against Soldiers are also identified. 
 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation - Homogeneous Sunni Population Scenario
S/No Scenario Overall Mean Civ To Civ Mean Civ To Sol Mean
1 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion 367 286 81
2 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 1235 406 829
3 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion 362 281 81
4 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 1212 399 813  
Table 9 Summary of Aggregated Civilian Escalation in Homogeneous Sunni 
Population Hybrid Scenarios 
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Obviously, civilian escalation has increased significantly in those 
scenarios where Election Booths were deployed. At first, this appears to 
contradict the earlier observations where deployments of Election Booths 
improved the voter participation.  
 
Homogeneous Sunni Population 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation (Mean)
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Figure 115 Summary of Aggregated Civilian Escalation in Homogeneous Sunni 
Population Hybrid Scenarios 
 
However, a closer look reveals that the majority of the escalation is 
between the Civilians and Soldiers. Note that this relationship is opposite that 
observed in those scenarios where no Election Booths are deployed, for which 
the majority of the escalation is between the civilians. The escalation between 
the civilians also increased, however the percentage of votes also increased, 
again this may indicate that the situation is manageable and is not chasing the 
civilians away from the polling center. Since PAX did not report the different 
actions carried out by the civilian groups, we can only interpret that the majority 
of the escalation is between the hostile civilians. 
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The type and number of actions carried out by Soldiers against 
Civilians during the entire simulations in both the scenarios where Election 
Booths are deployed are also of interest. Figure 116, Figure 117 and Figure 118 
show the results for the Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario and 
the results are about the same for the other scenario. Clearly, the majority (i.e., 
97%) of the actions carried out by the Soldiers are attempting to calm the 
civilians, rather than threatening or attacking the civilians. Recall also that a 
Soldier will only “attack” as a defensive measure in response to civilian actions, 
according to the specific ROE. Overall, the Soldiers’ actions are considered non-
alarming and non-violent.  
Observations made from the simulation runs also indicate that the 
Election Booths manage to attract hostile civilians. While Soldiers at the Election 
Booths attempt to calm and pacify the civilians, opportunities are created for 
motivated civilians to proceed to the poll center and cast their votes. Because 
voter participation increases, these opportunities appear to lead to success.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that minimal violence has taken place 
and the average aggregated civilian escalation is manageable and is under 
control. For example, in over half of the scenarios the Soldiers took no attacking 
actions.  In over 90% of the scenarios, at most one such action occurred. 
 
 
Figure 116 Calming Actions By Soldiers in Homogeneous Sunni Population 




Figure 117 Threatening Actions By Soldiers in Homogeneous Sunni Population 
Scenarios with Election Booths 
 
 
Figure 118 Attacking Actions By Soldiers in Homogeneous Sunni Population 
Scenarios with Election Booths 
 
This again indicates that on an average, the deployment of Election 
Booths has contributed positive outcomes in Homogeneous Sunni Population 
scenarios. 
c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The summary of the average civilian fear, anger and RFA results 
for all homogeneous Sunni population scenarios generated in Chapter IV are 
tabulated in Table 10. Refer to Figure 119 for a chart comparison on the average 
civilian fear, anger and RFA results between the scenarios. 
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S/No Scenario Fear Anger RFA
1 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion 88 87 31
2 Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 78 86 32
3 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion 88 87 31
4 Homo+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 78 86 32
Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA - Homogeneous Sunni Population Scenario
 
Table 10 Summary of the Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA in 
Homogeneous Sunni Population Scenario 
 
The table and chart clearly indicate that the average civilian fear 
and anger levels are high and the average civilian RFA level is low. This shows 
that in this scenario, the civilians are generally fearful, easily agitated and 
become angry, but their likelihood of acting aggressively is low. Therefore, on an 
average, the propensity towards a high conflict and hostile environment in this 
scenario is low. 
 
Homogeneous Sunni Population 




























Figure 119 Summary of the Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA in 





A sizeable reduction of civilian fear and a marginal reduction in 
civilian anger are observed in those scenarios with Election Booths deployed. On 
the other hand, there is a marginal deterioration in civilian RFA. But, this marginal 
increase in RFA level may be considered insignificant since their values are low.  
The proportions of the average civilian anger and RFA across all 
the scenarios are quite similar. This equal proportions suggest that these 
average civilian emotional and psychological states can be considered constant 
across all scenarios. Having these civilian states constant, we attempt to identify 
the differences between all the scenarios and their contributed outcomes. We 
identified that the deployment of the Election Booth is the only change made and 
its positive contributions, especially improvement in voter participation, are 
highlighted in the previous sections. This increased in voter participation coupled 
with the decrease in civilian fear indicated another advantage that the actual 
civilian fears in the scenarios with Election Booths are even lower. 
In general, this research demonstrates that the deployment of 
Election Booths improves the average voter participation while containing civilian 
escalation within a manageable and non-violent environment. Therefore, it is a 
military measure worthy of consideration for deployment in future elections. 
2. Regression Tree and Model Fitting Analysis 
The summary of the “main effect” terms that show up statistically as 
contributing factors in the metamodels of Voter Participation Percentage and 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation for any of the homogeneous Sunni population 
scenarios in Chapter IV, is tabulated as shown in Table 11. A “+” sign indicates 
that the presence of the term in the model has a positive impact on the stated 
MOE.  For quantitative factors, this means that increasing the factor will improve 
the MOE (i.e., increase the voter participation or decrease the escalation).  For 
qualitative factors, a “+” sign indicates the particular factor level is associated 
with improved MOEs.  A “(+)” sign has the same indication as a “+” sign, but has 
a greater positive impact to the model. A “-“ sign indicates that the term has a 
negative effect on the model. A “(-)” sign has the same indication as a “-” sign but 
































































































































Significant Terms  /  R2 Value 0.73 0.74 0.5 0.71 0.76 0.71 0.8 0.6
Civ1: Sunni Bystander/Fearful
Fear - + + + (-) + -
Anger + - - - + - +
RFA (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) - (-)
Elective Motivation
Civ2: Sunni “Yes” Voter
Fear
Anger - - - -
RFA - -
Elective Motivation
Civ3: Sunni “No” Voter
Fear
Anger - - - -
RFA - -
Elective Motivation (+) (+) (+) (+)
Civ4: Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter
Fear
Anger - -
RFA - - - -
Elective Motivation




RFA - - - -
Elective Motivation
Willingness to Cooperate
Civilian Personality Variance - - - - - -
Poll Soldier ROE Set 1 + - + - + +
Poll Soldier ROE Set 2 - - - + - -
Poll Soldier ROE Set 3 - - - - - -
Poll Soldier ROE Set 4 + - + - + +
Poll Soldier ROE Set 5 + + + + + +
Poll Soldier ROE Set 6 - - - + + +
Control Soldier ROE Set 1 - (+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 2 - (+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 3 + (+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 4 - (-) (-)
Control Soldier ROE Set 5 (+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 6 - (+) (+)
Aggregated Civ EscalationPercentage of Votes
Homogeneous Sunni Population Scenario
 
Table 11 Summary of Model Terms for Homogeneous Sunni Population 
Scenario 
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Note that some factors did not show up in any of the models, such as 
Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voter Elective Motivation, Sunni “Yes” Voter 
Elective Motivation, Sunni “No” Voter Fear, Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter Fear and 
Disturber Willingness To Cooperate.  This does not mean that they are not 
important, but rather they are not statistically proven to be significant in the 
presence of other factors that are studied in the experiment for the stated MOE.  
Instead of discussing the results separately for each MOE, we now summarize 
some of the important findings that provide general guidance. 
a. Percentage of Votes 
From those terms that show up in the experiment for MOE – 
Percentage of Votes, some terms (such as Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voters 
Anger and Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 1) appear to have mixed impacts for different 
scenarios. Other factors appear to have a consistently positive or negative 
impact on the MOE across all scenarios.  These are of particular interest, 
because appropriate changes in the factor levels can lead to improvements 
across all scenarios. 
The Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation term has a very high 
positive impact across all scenarios. This indicates that in order to achieve high 
voter participation, the level of elective motivation among the Sunni “No” Voters 
must be maintained at high levels in all homogeneous Sunni population 
scenarios. Recall that the result for Sunni “Yes” and “No” Voters are interpreted 
interchangeably, therefore the level of elective motivation should be high for both. 
The Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voter RFA term has shown up 
statistically significant with high negative impact on the model and is constant 
throughout all scenarios. This indicates that in order to achieve a high voting 
participation, the level of RFA among Sunni Bystander and the Fearful Voter 
must be kept at their lowest in all homogeneous Sunni population scenarios.  
Sunni “Yes” Voter Anger, Sunni “No” Voter, Anger and Civilian 
Personality Variance terms have shown up with a negative impact to the model 
consistently throughout all scenarios, but each of these terms has a smaller 
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impact than the terms mentioned above. Nevertheless, they are considered key 
factors for the election scenarios, and their levels must be kept at their lowest 
values in order to achieve better voting participation results. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Similarly, from the metamodels of the MOE – Aggregated Civilian 
Escalation, some terms (such as Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voter Anger and 
Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 1) appear to have mixed impacts on different scenarios. 
Other terms appear to have constant positive or negative impact on the MOE 
across all scenarios. 
Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 appear highly beneficial 
when no Election Booths are deployed. This indicates that in order to achieve low 
civilian escalation in homogeneous Sunni population scenarios where no Election 
Booths are deployed, Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 must be 
executed. On the contrary, the execution of Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 4 “Gandhi” 
in the same scenarios has statistically significant negative impact to the stated 
MOE and therefore must be avoided. Note that in those scenarios where Election 
Booths are deployed, Control Soldiers’ ROE terms did not show up in the model. 
This suggests that any of the six ROE rule sets can be executed at the Control 
Area with similar civilian escalation outcomes. 
The Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voter RFA term shows up with 
high negative impacts on the models; especially in the scenarios where Election 
Booths are deployed. This suggests that in order to achieve a low civilian 
escalation in the scenarios where Election Booths are deployed, the level of RFA 
among Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voters must be kept low. 
The RFA term in both Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter and Disturber 
groups show up with a negative impact to the model consistently throughout all 
scenarios, but each of these terms has a lesser statistical significant impact. 
Nevertheless, they are considered key factors that have significant contribution to 
the election scenarios and in this case, their levels must be kept at their lowest in 
order to improve the civilian escalation. 
157
3. Effect of ROE 
It is clearly illustrated in Table 11 that the Control Soldiers’ ROE does not 
contribute in the aspect of improving voter participation in all scenarios. However, 
it has significant contribution in improving civilian escalation especially in 
scenarios where Election Booths are deployed. In this case, the execution of 
ROE Set 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 will be desired at the Control Area. On the contrary, 
Soldiers at the Control Area should avoid ROE Set 4 “Gandhi” at all times. 
Looking across all scenarios, most Poll Soldiers’ ROE terms have a mix of 
positive and negative impacts. However, Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 5 has a positive 
impact in six of the eight scenarios, and no impact in the remaining two 
scenarios. This suggests that Soldiers at the Poll Area should execute ROE Set 
5 at all times to achieve good overall results for voter participation and civilian 
escalation. Conversely, Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 3 has a consistent negative 
impact to the model across all scenarios. Therefore, it suggests that Soldiers at 
the Poll Area should avoid executing ROE Set 3 at all times. 
However, precaution must be taken to consider the interactions between 
the Poll and Control Solders’ ROE factors with other factors in the model. The 
importance of this interaction’s effects is highlighted with the 
Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario, where we have both Poll and Control 
Soldiers’ ROE terms appearing together as key factors in the aggregated civilian 
escalation model.  
 





Figure 121 Profiler Analysis on Poll and Control Soldiers’ ROE (Value = 1) in 
Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Scenario 
 
JMP provides a prediction profiler tool which made the analysis of the 
model’s main effects and their interactions easier. This tool provides a prediction 
trace on the response variable as it changes while keeping the other factors 
constant at their current values. Refer to Figure 120 and Figure 121 for the 
effects of the Poll and Control Soldiers’ ROE on the civilian escalation when they 
are both set to value -1 and 1. The Prediction Profiler plots illustrated that when 
the Poll and Control Soldiers’ ROE are both set to the value -1, the aggregated 
civilian escalation is 588 units.  When they are both set to the value 1, the 
aggregated civilian escalation drops significantly from 588 to 300 units. Notice 
that the marginal effect of the Civ1F (Sunni Bystander and Fearful Voter Fear) 
term has changed because of its interaction with the rule set.  In Figure 120, 
increasing Civ1F will increase escalation; in Figure 121, increasing Civ1F will 
decrease escalation. 
4. Effect of Civilian Personality Variability 
It is clearly illustrated in Table 11 that the Civilian Personality Variance 
term consistently shows up with negative effects in the most of the models. This 
suggests that the variability of fear, anger and RFA level among the civilians an 
impact on the election outcome. 
The results suggest that small personality variances among the civilian are 
desired in most of the scenarios in order to achieve good voter participation and 
low civilian escalation in the presence of the recommended military measures. 
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Figure 122 Profiler Analysis on Civilian Personality Variance (Value = 10) in 
Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Scenario 
 
Prediction Profiler analysis is conducted for the effect of Civilian 
Personality Variance term on the voter participation outcome in 
Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion scenario. Refer to Figure 122 and Figure 123 
for the effects of Civilian Personality Variance on the voter participation when it is 
set to value 10 and 0, respectively. The Prediction Profiler plots illustrate that 
when the civilian personality has a smaller variability, the vote percentage is  
18% (vs. 16% when civilian personality variability is high). Note that the effects of 
strong interaction terms are also felt in Civ1F and Civ1A terms (Sunni Bystander 
and Fearful Voter Fear and Anger). 
 
Figure 123 Profiler Analysis on Civilian Personality Variance (Value = 0) in 
Homo+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion Scenario 
 
5. Effect of Civilian Leadership Influence 
The Civ4W – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter Leadership Willingness-To-
Cooperate term shows up three times over the eight scenarios in Table 11. On 
the contrary, Civ5W – Disturber Leadership Willingness-To-Cooperate term does 
not show up at all. 
This distinction clearly identifies that the Civ4W has a greater impact on 
the election outcome than does the Civ5W term. Therefore, the importance of a 
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leadership’s influences that the military can leverage on in homogeneous Sunni 
population scenarios lies with the Civ4 – Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter Leaders.  
However, note that when the Civ4W term appears, it has a negative 
impact. This indicates that too much cooperative effort from Sunni Trouble-Maker 
Voter Leaders may not be desired at times, as it can worsen the situation. This 
might be partially due to the limited type of cooperation possible in PAX.  The 
only thing a leader can do is to suggest his followers to go home.  This might 
lead to civilians within the polling area deciding to leave before casting their 
votes. 
 
C. HETEROGENEOUS SUNNI, SHIITE/KURD POPULATION SCENARIO 
1. Data Distribution Analysis 
a. Percentage of Votes 
The summary of the voter participation results for all heterogeneous 
Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population scenarios generated in Chapter IV are tabulated in 
Table 12. Refer to Figure 124 for a chart comparison on the mean percentage of 
voter participation results between the scenarios. 
 
Number of Votes (Percentage) - Heterogeneous Sunni + Shiite/Kurd Population Scenario
S/No Scenario Lowest Mean Median Highest Dense
1 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion 12.4 28.3 28.4 45.1 No
2 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 14.2 28.8 28.4 50.9 No
3 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion 13.5 28.3 28.2 40.8 No
4 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 12.3 28.6 27.9 50.5 No  
Table 12 Summary of Voter Participation (%) in Heterogeneous Sunni, 
Shiite/Kurd Population Hybrid Scenarios 
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Heterogeneous Sunni + Shiite/Kurd Population 
Voting Participation (Mean %)












Figure 124 Summary of Voter Participation (%) in Heterogeneous Sunni, 
Shiite/Kurd Population Hybrid Scenarios 
 
The average voter participation has improved in those scenarios 
where Election Booths are deployed. However, although this improvement is 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.008), it is so small that it is of little practical 
importance. This can also be observed from the similarity of the median values, 
across all scenarios. Therefore, from the average vote percentage results, this 
research reveals that the deployment of Election Booths leads to a small but 
statistically significant improvement to the average voter participation in 
heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population scenario. Note that the maximum 
participation rates are higher when the Election Booths are deployed, suggesting 
that there may be a greater possibility of a very high voter turnout. Perhaps if 
resources are limited, then election booths might be better deployed in towns that 
had low turnouts in previous elections. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
The summary of the average aggregated civilian escalation results 
for all heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population scenarios generated in 
Chapter IV are tabulated in Table 13. Refer to Figure 125 for a chart comparison 
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on the mean aggregated civilian escalation results between the scenarios. 
Civilian escalations against other Civilians or against Soldiers are also identified. 
 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation - Heterogeneous Sunni + Shiite/Kurd Population Scenario
S/No Scenario Overall Mean Civ To Civ Mean Civ To Sol Mean
1 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion 252 197 55
2 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 1048 283 765
3 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion 251 196 55
4 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 1024 280 744  
Table 13 Summary of Aggregated Civilian Escalation in Heterogeneous Sunni, 
Shiite/Kurd Population Hybrid Scenarios 
 
Obviously, civilian escalation has increased significantly in those 
scenarios where Election Booths are deployed. The results indicated that the 
majority of the escalation is between the Civilians and Soldiers. Note that this 
proportion is the opposite of those scenarios where no Election Booths are 
deployed where majority of the escalation is between the civilians. 
Heterogeneous Sunni + Shiite/Kurd Population 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation (Mean)










Aggregated Civilian Escalation (Mean)
Civ To Civ Mean
Civ To Sol Mean
 
Figure 125 Summary of Aggregated Civilian Escalation in Heterogeneous Sunni, 
Shiite/Kurd Population Hybrid Scenarios 
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The type and number of aggressive actions carried out during the 
entire simulations in both the scenarios where Election Booths are deployed are 
investigated. Figure 126, Figure 127 and Figure 128 show the results for the 
Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booth scenario and the results are about 
the same for the other scenario. It has clearly indicated that majority (i.e., 94%) of 
the actions carried out by the Soldiers are attempts to calm the civilians. This 
action is considered non-alarming and non-violent, as compared to the 
threatening and attacking actions that are occasionally conducted by the 
Soldiers.  
Observations made from the simulation runs also indicated that the 
Election Booths manages to attract hostile civilians, just as they did for the 
homogeneous scenarios. While Soldiers at the Election Booths are attempting to 
calm and pacify the civilians, opportunities are created for elective motivated 
civilians to proceed to the poll center and cast their votes. This suggests that 
minimal violence has taken place and the average aggregated civilian escalation 
is manageable and is under control.  It would be interesting for future studies to 
investigate whether the increased escalation among civilians occurs primarily 
among the hostile civilians clustered around the election booths, rather than 
between hostile civilians and registered voters or bystanders. 
 
Figure 126 Calming Actions By Soldiers in Heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd 




Figure 127 Threatening Actions By Soldiers in Heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd 
Population Scenarios with Election Booths 
 
 
Figure 128 Attacking Actions By Soldiers in Heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd 
Population Scenarios with Election Booths 
 
c. Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA 
The summary of the average civilian fear, anger and RFA results 
for all heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population scenarios generated in 
Chapter IV are tabulated in Table 14. Refer to Figure 129 for a chart comparison 
on the average civilian fear, anger and RFA results between the scenarios. 
S/No Scenario Fear Anger RFA
1 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion 88 81 27
2 Heter+DisturberLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 78 83 28
3 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion 88 81 27
4 Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion+Booths 78 83 28
Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA - Heterogeneous Sunni + Shiite/Kurd Population Scenario
 
Table 14 Summary of the Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA in 
Heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd Population Scenario 
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Heterogeneous Sunni + Shiite/Kurd Population 




























Figure 129 Summary of the Average Civilian Fear, Anger and RFA in 
Heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd Population Scenario 
 
From the table and chart, it is clearly that the average civilian fear 
and anger levels are high and the average civilian RFA level is low. The average 
anger and RFA are lower than in the homogeneous scenarios by about 4 units. 
This indicates that in this scenario, the civilians are generally fearful, easily 
agitated and become angry but their likelihood of acting aggressively is low. 
Therefore, on an average, the propensity towards a high conflict and hostile 
environment in this scenario is low. 
A sizeable reduction in civilian fear is observed in those scenarios 
with Election Booths deployed. On the other hand, there is a marginal 
deterioration in both civilian RFA and anger. 
The proportions of the average civilian anger and RFA across all 
the scenarios are almost similar. This equal proportion indicated that in general, 
the average civilian emotional and psychological states can be considered 
constant across all scenarios. Having these civilian’s states constant, we 
identified that the deployment of Election Booths is the only change made. 
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However, it did not have any significant improvement to the voter participation 
and civilian escalation. 
In general, this experiment demonstrates that the deployment of 
Election Booth has little impact on the overall situation in this heterogeneous 
Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population scenario. 
2. Regression Tree and Model Fitting Analysis 
The summary of the “main effect” terms that showed up statistically as 
contributing factors in the metamodels of Voter Participation and Aggregated 
Civilian Escalation for any of the heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population 
scenarios in Chapter IV is tabulated as shown in Table 15. A “+” sign indicates 
that the presence of the term in the model has a positive impact on the model or 
is improving the stated MOE.  A “(+)” sign has the same indication as a “+” sign, 
but has a greater positive significant impact to the model. A “-” sign indicates that 
the term has a negative effect on the model. A “(-)” sign has the same indication 
































































































































Significant Terms  /  R2 Value 0.73 0.74 0.5 0.71 0.76 0.71 0.8 0.6
Civ1: Shiite/Kurd "Yes" Voter
Fear -
Anger - - - -
RFA - - - - - (-) (-) -
Elective Motivation (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) + +
Civ2: Sunni “Yes” Voter
Fear
Anger - -
RFA - - - - - (-) - -
Elective Motivation - - - -
Civ3: Sunni “No” Voter
Fear -
Anger
RFA - - -
Elective Motivation + - + - (-)









RFA - (-) -
Elective Motivation
Willingness to Cooperate
Civilian Personality Variance - - - - - (-) - (-)
Poll Soldier ROE Set 1 - + + (+) (+)
Poll Soldier ROE Set 2 + + - (+) (+)
Poll Soldier ROE Set 3 + - - (+) (-)
Poll Soldier ROE Set 4 - - (-) (-)
Poll Soldier ROE Set 5 + + + (+) (+)
Poll Soldier ROE Set 6 - + + (+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 1 (+) (+) (+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 2 (+) (+) (+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 3 (+) (+) (+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 4 (-) (-) (-) (-)
Control Soldier ROE Set 5 (+) (+) (+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 6 (+) (+) (+) (-)
Heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd Population Scenario
Percentage of Votes Aggregated Civ Escalation
 
Table 15 Summary of Model Terms for Heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd 
Population Scenario 
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It is observed that some factors did not show up in any of the models, 
such as Sunni “Yes” Voter Fear, Sunni “No” Voter Anger, Sunni Trouble-Maker 
Voter and Disturber Willingness to Cooperate.  Note that it is not conclusive that 
they are not important, but rather they are not statistically proven to be significant 
in the presence of other factors that are studied in the experiment for the stated 
MOE. 
a. Percentage of Votes 
From those terms that have shown up in the experiment for MOE – 
Number of Vote Percentage, only the Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation term 
appear to have mixed impacts for different scenarios. Some terms appear to 
have constantly positive or negative impact on the MOE across all scenarios. 
The Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation term has a high positive 
impact across all scenarios. This indicates that in order to achieve high voter 
participation, the level of elective motivation among the Shiite/Kurd Voter must be 
maintained at high levels in all heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population 
scenarios.  Once again, since the “Yes” and “No” Shiite/Kurd Voters are modeled 
in the same manner, this can be interpreted as maintaining high levels of election 
motivation among all Shiite/Kurd voters. 
No term with consistently high negative impacts show up in any of 
the models. However, the Shiite/Kurd Voter Anger and RFA, Sunni “Yes” Voter 
RFA and Civilian Personality Variance terms show up with negative impact 
across most of the scenarios. These are considered key factors that have 
significant contribution to the election scenarios. Their levels must be kept at low 
values in order to achieve high voter participation. 
b. Aggregated Civilian Escalation 
Similarly, from those terms that show up in the experiment for MOE 
– Aggregated Civilian Escalation, some terms such as Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 2, 
3 and 4 appear to have mixed impacts on different scenarios. Other terms 
appear to have a consistent positive or negative impact on the MOE across all 
scenarios. 
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Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 1, 2, 3 and 5 terms show up with a high 
positive impact on the model across all scenarios. This indicates that in order to 
achieve low civilian escalation in heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population 
scenarios, Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 1, 2, 3 and 5 must be executed. In contrast, 
the execution of Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 4 “Gandhi” in the same scenarios has 
statistically significant negative impact to the stated MOE and therefore must be 
avoided.  
The Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA, Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA and Civilian 
Personality Variance terms show up with a consistent negative impact. This 
suggests that in order to achieve low civilian escalation in the scenarios, the level 
of RFA among Shiite/Kurd Voters and Sunni “Yes” Voters must be kept at their 
lowest level. At the same time, less escalation occurs if the variation in initial fear, 
anger and RFA personalities among each group of civilians is small. 
3. Effect of ROE 
It is clearly illustrated in Table 15 that the Control Soldiers’ ROE term does 
not affect voter participation. However, it has significant contribution in improving 
civilian escalation in all scenarios. In this case, the execution of ROE Set 1, 2, 3 
and 5 at the Control Area is desirable. In contrast, Soldiers at the Control Area 
should avoid ROE Set 4 “Gandhi” at all times. 
As for the homogeneous cases, the Poll Soldiers’ ROE terms have mixed 
positive and negative impacts to the model. However, Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 5 
has the most constant positive impact to the model across all scenarios. This 
suggests that Soldiers at the Poll Area should execute ROE Set 5 at all times to 
achieve the best overall results for voter participation and civilian escalation. In 
contrast, Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 4 “Gandhi” has a constant negative impact on 
escalation in all four models. This suggests that Soldiers at the Poll Area should 
avoid executing ROE Set 4 “Gandhi” at all times. 
However, precaution must be taken to consider the interactions between 
the Poll and Control Solders’ ROE factors with other factors in the model. The 
importance of this interaction effect is highlighted with the 
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Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion scenario where we have both Poll and 
Control Soldiers’ ROE terms appearing together as key factors in the aggregated 
civilian escalation model. 
 




Figure 131 Profiler Analysis on Poll and Control Soldiers’ ROE (Value = 1) in 
Heter+TroubleMakerLead+CtrlRegion Scenario 
 
The JMP Prediction Profiler tool can be used to analyze their interaction 
effects. Refer to Figure 130 and Figure 131 for the effects of Poll and Control 
Soldiers’ ROE on the civilian escalation when they are both set to the value -1 
and 1, respectively. The Prediction Profiler plots illustrated that when the Poll and 
Control Soldiers’ ROE are both set to value 1, the aggregated civilian escalation 
drops significantly from 470 to 217 units. Notice that the marginal effects of 
Civ1R (Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA), Civ2R (Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA) and Civ3R 
(Sunni “No” Voter RFA) change because of their interaction with the Poll and 
Control Soldier’s ROEs. The resulting plots also indicate that a more robust result 
is achieved when Poll and Control Soldiers’ ROEs are both set to the value 1, 
since the subplot lines that indicate marginal effects are nearly horizontal. 
4. Effect of Civilian Personality Variability 
It is clearly illustrated in Table 15 that the Civilian Personality Variance 
term consistently shows up with negative effects in most of the models. This 
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suggests that the variability of fear, anger and RFA level among the civilians has 
an impact on the election outcome. 
The results suggest that small personality variances among the civilian are 
desired in most of the scenarios in order to achieve good voter participation and 
low civilian escalation in the presence of the recommended military’s measures. 
5. Effect of Civilian Leadership Influence 
The Willingness-To-Cooperate terms in both Civ4W – Sunni Trouble-
Maker Voters and Civ5W – Disturbers did not show up in any of the models 
summarized in Table 15. 
This indicates that the military cannot improve election operations by 
attempting to leverage leadership’s influences among trouble-maker or disturber 
groups in heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population scenarios. They are 
equally effective or ineffective by dealing with threatening or attacking civilians on 
an individual basis.  
 
D. HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS POPULATION 
SCENARIOS COMPARISON 
The summary of the “main effect” terms that showed up statistically as 
contributing factors, with reference to the MOE –Percentage of Vote and 
Aggregated Civilian Escalation in the metamodel generated for both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous population scenarios is tabulated as shown in 
Table 16. Note that the signs’ representations are similar to the earlier 
description and their respective signs are appended when the same factor has 

































































































































Fear - + + + (-) + -
Anger + - - - + - +
RFA (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) - (-)
Elective Motivation
Civ1: Shiite/Kurd "Yes" Voter
Fear -
Anger - - - -
RFA - - - - - (-) (-) -
Elective Motivation (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) + +
Civ2: Sunni “Yes” Voter
Fear
Anger - -- - --
RFA - - - - -- (-) -- -
Elective Motivation - - - -
Civ3: Sunni “No” Voter
Fear -
Anger - - - -
RFA -- -- -
Elective Motivation (+)+ (+)- (+)+ (+)- (-)
Civ4: Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter
Fear
Anger - -
RFA -- - -- -
Elective Motivation




RFA -- (-)- - --
Elective Motivation
Willingness to Cooperate
Civilian Personality Variance -- -- -- -- -- (-)- - (-)-
Poll Soldier ROE Set 1 + - +- +- ++ (+) (+)+
Poll Soldier ROE Set 2 - - +- ++ -- (+) (+)-
Poll Soldier ROE Set 3 - - +- -- -- (+) (-)-
Poll Soldier ROE Set 4 + - + -- +- (-) (-)+
Poll Soldier ROE Set 5 + + ++ ++ ++ (+) (+)+
Poll Soldier ROE Set 6 - - -- ++ ++ (+) (+)+
Control Soldier ROE Set 1 - (+)(+) (+) (+)(+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 2 - (+)(+) (+) (+)(+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 3 + (+)(+) (+) (+)(+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 4 - (-)(-) (-) (-)(-) (-)
Control Soldier ROE Set 5 (+)(+) (+) (+)(+) (+)
Control Soldier ROE Set 6 - (+)(+) (+) (+)(+) (-)
Combine Homogeneous & Heterogeneous Population Scenarios
Percentage of Votes Aggregated Civ Escalation
 
Table 16 Summary of Model Terms for Both Homogeneous and Heterogeneous 
Population Scenarios 
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1. Effect of Election Booth 
In summary, the deployment of the Election Booth in homogeneous Sunni 
population scenarios has proven its ability to attract hostile civilians towards it, 
and in turn create opportunities for motivated civilian voters to advance towards 
the Poll Center and cast their votes. Hence, the average voter participation has 
improved. However, only marginal improvements are observed in the 
heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population scenarios. This result seems 
intuitive since the civilians in the latter scenarios are already highly motivated to 
participate in the election. 
An increased in civilian escalation is observed in both homogeneous and 
heterogeneous scenarios when Election Booths are deployed. However, the 
majority of these civilian escalations occur mainly between civilians and soldiers 
– presumably the soldiers manning the Election Booths. More escalation among 
civilians is also observed, but since voter participation remains the same or rises, 
this escalation may only be among hostile civilians clustered around the Election 
Booths. Furthermore, the aggressive actions in the increased escalation are 
mainly calming actions performed by the soldiers towards the civilians. Hence, 
the increased civilian escalation is considered non-violent and controllable. 
2. Effect of ROE 
It is clearly illustrated in Table 16 that Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 5 
consistently shows up with a positive impact in all homogeneous and 
heterogeneous scenarios. However, there are mixed negative and positive 
impacts from the other five ROE sets. Therefore, this result indicates that military 
measures should consider executing ROE Set 5 in the Poll Area for both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios.  Alternatively, the prediction profiler 
tool could be used to see whether using other ROE sets leads to large or small 
degradations in the MOEs. 
Table 16 also shows that the choice of Control Soldiers’ ROE does not 
contribute to improved voter participation, but using ROE Set 3 and 5 decreases 
the escalation in all homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios. Therefore, this 
result indicates that military measures should consider executing ROE Set 3 and 
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5 in the Control Area for both homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios. 
Recall that ROE Set 3 is similar to the PSO Manual Ruleset, except that the 
Soldier threatens (rather than defends) in situations where the civilian attacks 
and the dominating group behavior is also “attack.”  For ROE Set 5, the Soldier 
threatens any civilian who attacks or threatens the Soldier, regardless of the 
dominating group behavior. 
In contrast, it is also highlighted in Table 16 that the effect of Control 
Soldiers’ ROE Set 4 “Gandhi” has shown up with significant negative impact to 
the model in all scenarios. Therefore, this result indicates that military measures 
should avoid executing ROE Set 4 “Gandhi” in the Control Area for both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios. 
3. Effect of Civilian Personality Variability 
The Civilian Personality Variance term has consistently shown up with a 
negative impact to the models in all homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios, 
as illustrated in Table 16. This result has indicated that the election outcomes are 
better if the variability of fear, anger and RFA from the average level within each 
civilian group is small. 
4. Effect of Civilian Leadership Influence 
The effect of Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter Leadership’s Willingness-To-
Cooperate term shows up in three out of the 16 models with a negative impact. 
However, the effect of Disturber Leadership’s Willingness-To-Cooperate term 
does not show up at all. This result indicates that the Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter 
Leadership has greater potential influence on the election outcome than the 
Disturber Leadership in both homogeneous and heterogeneous scenario. 
Therefore, the importance of leadership’s influences that the military can 
leverage on should lie with the Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter Leaders.  
However, note that Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter Leadership’s Willingness-
To-Cooperate term shows up in the models with a negative impact. This 
indicates that too much cooperation from Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter Leaders 
may not be desirable especially in the homogeneous population scenario, 
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because at times, as it can make the situation take a turn for the worst. This may 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter concludes the analysis of the military tactics, techniques and 
procedures that are proposed and modeled in this research. It also proposes 
desired enhancements in PAX and possible areas for future research. 
 
A. PEACEKEEPING – ELECTION OPERATIONS 
This thesis is based on the belief that one of the primary priorities in 
peacekeeping election operation effort is to provide physical and psychological 
security for the Iraqi voters in the election areas. The proposed multiple security 
control regions (i.e., Poll and Control Areas) with manned checkpoints aim to 
provide a secure and safe environment for both the soldiers and Iraqi voters. 
Election Booths are deployed to encourage voter participation and deter 
escalation of civilian aggression. Trouble-maker and disturber leaderships are 
also studied to identify how cooperation from these civilian groups’ leaders might 
influence the election outcomes. 
Four representative homogeneous Sunni population hybrid scenarios are 
modeled after the Anbar province, which was reported as having the lowest voter 
participation and the most violence during the last election. Another four 
representative heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd population hybrid scenarios are 
modeled after the Tamin province, which had one of the highest voter 
participation rates in a mixed area during the last election. An agent-based 
simulation system designed specifically for peace-support operations is 
employed to aid in the modeling and simulation of these eight hybrid scenarios. 
Over 61,680 simulation runs are conducted, using very efficient experimental 
designs, in order to explore 24 factors that potentially influence the election 
outcomes. The following MOEs are examined to evaluate the effectiveness of the 




• Percentage of votes 
• Aggregated civilian escalation 
• Average civilian fear, anger and RFA 
• Number and type of aggressive actions carried out by the civilians 
and soldiers 
Regression analyses techniques are used to generate metamodels of the 
MOEs.  These metamodels reveal which of the many experimental factors 
(including characteristics of the civilian groups as well as military tactics, 
techniques, and procedures) are have the greatest influence on the MOEs. The 
expected voter participation and expected civilian escalation in each of the eight 
hybrid scenarios. 
One criticism of agent-based simulations has been the inherent difficulty in 
accurately modeling human behavior. Note that this thesis does not attempt to 
make accurate predictions of outcomes for future elections.  Instead, varying 
factors (including civilian personality and motivation factors) in a designed 
experiment allows the analyst to identify the important factors and come up with 
general insights. This thesis can act as a basis for future studies on other Iraq 
cities or other nations that are facing similar election situations. Over time, 
comparisons of model results with real-world outcomes might provide guidance 
for selecting appropriate ranges for some of the civilian personality factors. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the experiment and analysis results, the following are the 
recommendations proposed for both the homogeneous and heterogeneous 
population scenarios. 
1. Homogeneous Sunni Population Scenario 
The deployment of Election Booths significantly improves the average 
voter participation. It also results in higher civilian escalation, but this is not 
considered alarming because the majority of the escalation is between civilians 
and soldiers. Furthermore, majority of the time, the soldiers are calming and 
pacifying the civilians instead of threatening or defending against them. 
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Therefore, with this controllable escalation and improvement in the average voter 
participation, this thesis recommends implementing the deployment of Election 
Booths in the homogeneous population scenario. Recall that these Election 
Booths represent stations manned by non-military agencies such as U.N. 
volunteers, Iraqi civilian volunteers, Iraqi police or other neutral forces. Their 
primary roles are to encourage civilians to come forward and cast votes, and to 
promote harmony in the election area. There are several ways these stations 
might attract a civilian’s attention; such as by distributing tangible incentive 
benefits like “goodie” bags packed with pro-election pamphlets, food, or drink.  In 
practice, specific methods for accomplishing the “pacifying” activities may be best 
determined by consulting with non-military agencies. 
With respect to the average voter participation and aggregated civilian 
escalation, the following factors have positive impacts on the election outcomes: 
• Sunni “No” Voter Elective Motivation  
• Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 5  
• Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 3 and 5  
The following are the identified significant factors that have a negative 
statistical impact on the election outcomes: 
• Sunni Bystanders and Fearful Voter RFA 
• Sunni “Yes” Voter Anger 
• Sunni “No” Voter Anger 
• Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter RFA 
• Disturber RFA 
• Civilian Personality Variance 
• Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 3 
• Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 4 
Therefore, this thesis recommends ROE Set 3 or 5 for the Control Area, 




The results also indicate that efforts to enlist to cooperation of civilian 
leaders should focus on the Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter group (rather than the 
Disturber Group) since the Sunni Trouble-Maker Voter leadership’s willingness to 
cooperate effect has greater effects on the election outcomes.  
In addition to the measures recommended above, the analysis also shows 
that a small variability among civilian personalities results in higher voter 
participation and lower civilian escalation. This suggests that the potential for 
conflict is greater when the individual civilian groups are less homogeneous. 
2. Heterogeneous Sunni, Shiite/Kurd Population Scenario 
In these scenarios, the deployment of Election Booths has little impact on 
the average voter participation. As in the homogeneous population scenario, the 
civilian escalation increases but the situation is not considered alarming.  To 
avoid the risk of increased escalation without a corresponding increase in voter 
participation, this thesis does not recommend implementing the deployment of 
Election Booths in the heterogeneous population scenario. 
With respect to the average voter participation and aggregated civilian 
escalation, the following factors are found to have positive impacts on the 
election outcomes: 
• Shiite/Kurd Voter Elective Motivation  
• Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 5  
• Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 1, 2, 3 and 5  
The following factors have negative impacts on the election outcomes: 
• Shiite/Kurd Voter RFA 
• Sunni “Yes” Voter RFA 
• Civilian Personality Variance 
• Poll Soldiers’ ROE Set 4 
• Control Soldiers’ ROE Set 4 
Therefore, this thesis recommends ROE Set 1, 2, 3 and 5 for Control Area 
Soldiers and ROE Set 5 for Poll Area Soldiers in order to achieve high voting 
participation and low civilian escalation. 
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In this heterogeneous population scenario, neither the Sunni Trouble-
Maker Voter leadership nor the Disturbers leadership’s willingness to cooperate 
effects appear in the models. This indicates that the military soldiers can focus on 
responding to individual civilians. 
In addition to the measures recommended above, the analysis also 
concludes that small variability among civilian personalities is associated with 
higher voter participation and lower civilian escalation.  This is consistent with the 
findings for the homogeneous population scenarios. 
According to Coalition Provisional Authority – Iraq Coalition, Iraqi citizens 
are moving towards having the means to provide for their own defense and 
police forces, and to assume responsibility for both external and internal security 
[CPA, 2005b]. In support of this independent effort, the results and insights from 
this thesis may act as possible guidelines or references in preparing the Iraqi 
forces for the upcoming elections - especially in the area of training and 
deployment measures.  
This study also identified that Poll Area ROE Set 5 and Control Area ROE 
Set 3 have consistently positive impacts on the election outcomes for both the 
homogeneous and heterogeneous population scenarios. The common ROEs 
suggest that the effort required to train the ill-equipped and unprepared Iraqi 
forces could be streamlined. Focusing only on these two identified ROEs for 
deployment could shorten the learning curve required for training the Iraqi forces 
 
C. FUTURE WORKS 
1. PAX Development 
Unlike the traditional combat attrition-based models, PAX has the ability to 
model civilian behaviors and enables the user to investigate the effects of 
different actions of the military under specific civilian conditions. This has made it 
a suitable tool for the analysis of peace support operations like election 
operations. 
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The following feedback to the developers is intended to enhance the 
system for the benefit of the larger simulation community: 
• Currently, ten different civilian groups can be modeled in a single 
PAX scenario. However, the generated MOEs (such as End of 
Simulation Fear, Anger and RFA) are only available for the first five 
groups of civilians. Expanding this capability to all ten groups would 
allow a more comprehensive analysis in situations where there are 
more than five groups of civilians. For example, an analyst could 
evaluate the civilian fear levels at the end of the simulation for all 
ten groups to seek to understand the long term effects on different 
segments of the civilian population.  
• Currently, PAX does not allow a Soldier to target a single group 
leader and request their cooperation. This restriction makes it more 
difficult to study situations where there is more than one civilian 
group with leaders. 
• In a typical election scenario, we have different groups of law 
enforcers and facilitators such as police, military soldiers, non-
government officials, U.N. forces, neutral volunteers, etc. They 
each exhibit different roles and interactions with the civilians. The 
modeling of these different types of agents may facilitate the study 
of their contributions in election situations like Iraq.  For example, 
pacifying actions may be more successful if they are conducted by 
non-military agents than by soldiers. 
• The presence of law enforcers in the election town may influence 
the law and order of the civilians. Measure such as the capability 
for soldiers to patrol by foot along the streets in the town may be 
beneficial. Such features in PAX would provides more flexibility for 
modeling peace support operations 
• Currently, PAX automatically increases the fear level of the civilians 
once they have cast their votes successfully. This is to force the 
civilians to move back into their homes and not to mingle inside the 
polling area. This has caused the reported high fear level to be 
overstated. Therefore, it is desired for PAX to report the actual 
civilian fear level apart from those fear levels accumulated due to 
civilians who have voted.   
2. Research Areas 
The availability of high-performance computing and maturing of agent-
based models, coupled with good experimental designs and data-farming 
techniques, has extended the boundary limit of research on peace support 
operations. The following are some areas worthy of future exploration: 
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• The civilian “Norms for Anti-Aggression” personality is not modeled 
in this research because the Iraqis are so used to daily violence 
occurring around them that their “Norms for Anti-Aggression” level 
is generally low. However, this behavior may vary differently across 
cities and nations depending on the area of study. For example, 
humanitarian assistance operations may occur in places 
devastated by either natural disasters or civil strife, but civilians 
may be much more used to violence in the latter situation.  Hence, 
future research may consider implementing this factor.  
• Similarly, experiments can be performed which vary the civilian 
“Group Cohesiveness” behaviors.  This would permit detailed 
analyses in scenarios involving a distinct group with strong group 
dynamics and unity. 
• The civilian personality variance in this thesis varies according to a 
single variance factor. The results indicate that variability within 
civilian groups does impact the MOEs. Future research may 
choose to define separate variance factors for each civilian 
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